Author's Keywords: Israel, Hezbollah, Second Lebanon War, 2006 Lebanon War, July War, Strategy	Convention All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE" URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p311062_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Camilleri, Raphaelle. "Mind the Gap: Explaining Israel's inability to 'win' the Second Lebanon War against Hezbollah" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE", New York Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY, USA, Feb 15, 2009 <Not Available>. 2009-11-04 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p311062_index.html>

Camilleri, R. L. , 2009-02-15 "Mind the Gap: Explaining Israel's inability to 'win' the Second Lebanon War against Hezbollah" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE", New York Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY, USA Online <PDF>. 2009-11-04 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p311062_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: The outcome of the July 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war has confronted strategists with an apparent paradox, whereby one of the world’s most advanced armies was seemingly unable to translate its overwhelming military superiority into lasting political gains. The mixed outcome of the ‘Second Lebanon War’ epitomizes the dilemmas that conventionally-configured armies are increasingly facing in an operational environment characterized by the obliteration of the boundaries between military and political considerations. Above all, it raises the fundamental question of the political utility of military power in an era where traditional assumptions about the use of force are becoming, at best, inadequate. Using a conceptual framework derived from Clausewitz’s understanding of war as a political act, this paper suggests that the apparent discrepancy between tactical events and the war’s overall political outcome is effectively symptomatic of a growing ‘strategic vacuum’ at the interface between policy and tactics in Israel. It finds that this phenomenon is exacerbated by the peculiar nature of civil-military relations in Israel, its adoption of an apolitical technology-oriented conception of war that ignores the wider political context in which military capabilities are employed, and Israel’s related inability to grasp the importance of the perceptual dimension of military operations in such a context.

Testing the Second Level of Agenda Setting: Effects of News Frames on Reader-Assigned Attributes of Hezbollah and Israel in the 2006 War in Lebanon

Coping strategies among adolescents: Comparing Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs in the Second Lebanon War

The Effects of War on the Public Image of Political Leaders: Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Lebanon Hezbollah Leader Nasrallah