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Association: Name: Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p360523_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Pedersen, Rasmus. "The Hidden Wars in European Integration? Explaining national preference formation on European Treaty reforms - A Two Level Game" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, <Not Available>. 2009-11-11 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p360523_index.html>

Pedersen, R. B. "The Hidden Wars in European Integration? Explaining national preference formation on European Treaty reforms - A Two Level Game" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL <Not Available>. 2009-11-11 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p360523_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: Where do states’ positions on intergovernmental conferences come from? Despite a large number of studies we simply do not know which factors determine states’ positions in specific cases and why. This paper analyses position making between ‘governments’ and ‘parliaments’ during two rounds of constitutional bargains and analyses the role of information asymmetries as intermediating factors in generating ‘influence on position’. The question asked is: Do governments enjoy relative autonomy vis-à-vis Parliaments that enables them to develop ‘positions’ they feel are in ‘the national interest’? Or is Parliament able to control and direct government behaviour during these rounds of international negotiations’ and secure an ‘efficient’ and legitimate parliament control? The conclusions indicate that Parliaments control governmental positions, but governments, on the other hand, are also able to exploit the negotiations to pursue certain ‘policy drifts’ depending on the level of conflict between the two actors. The research design used is a in dept single case study that analyses the position making during two rounds of constitutional reforms on a multitude of different issues varied over the conflict level between actors.

Towards a Realist-Constructivist Theory of European Integration: Explaining Social Policy Cooperation from the Single European Act to the Maastricht Treaty

National Interests and the Development of the European Union's CFSP and ESDP: The Role of Domestic Political Preferences in Selecting the Level of Action and Institutions for Advancing Foreign and Defense Policy