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Failure to Disabuse: Exposure, Reception, and the Myth of Manipulating the Public into the Saddam-September 11th Belief

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Abstract:

A recent article by Gershkoff and Kushner (2005) attempts to empirically establish the popular belief that exposure to prewar administration rhetoric--whether directly from Colin Powell or mediated by news coverage--led Americans to infer that Iraq had strong ties to al-Qaeda. Contrary to this assertion, though, I show repeatedly that such self-reported exposure did not increase one’s likelihood of subscribing to Saddam-September 11 opinion. More importantly, my exposition of the evidence reveals that reception of political communications during this prewar time period substantially lowered one’s probability of answering the Saddam-September 11 question affirmatively. The problem, however, was that only the most politically capable Americans were able to regularly receive the corrective message necessary to disabuse them of the widespread inference of Iraqi involvement made immediately after 9/11. I demonstrate that had a louder disabusing message been provided significantly fewer Americans likely would have thought Saddam was involved in 9/11. Yet even in this counterfactual world, there still appears to be a sizable percentage that is simply uncorrectable. I conclude with evidence explaining why.
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Association:
Name: Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference
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http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/


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URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p360524_index.html
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MLA Citation:

Tesler, Michael. "Failure to Disabuse: Exposure, Reception, and the Myth of Manipulating the Public into the Saddam-September 11th Belief" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, <Not Available>. 2009-11-10 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p360524_index.html>

APA Citation:

Tesler, M. "Failure to Disabuse: Exposure, Reception, and the Myth of Manipulating the Public into the Saddam-September 11th Belief" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL <Not Available>. 2009-11-10 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p360524_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: A recent article by Gershkoff and Kushner (2005) attempts to empirically establish the popular belief that exposure to prewar administration rhetoric--whether directly from Colin Powell or mediated by news coverage--led Americans to infer that Iraq had strong ties to al-Qaeda. Contrary to this assertion, though, I show repeatedly that such self-reported exposure did not increase one’s likelihood of subscribing to Saddam-September 11 opinion. More importantly, my exposition of the evidence reveals that reception of political communications during this prewar time period substantially lowered one’s probability of answering the Saddam-September 11 question affirmatively. The problem, however, was that only the most politically capable Americans were able to regularly receive the corrective message necessary to disabuse them of the widespread inference of Iraqi involvement made immediately after 9/11. I demonstrate that had a louder disabusing message been provided significantly fewer Americans likely would have thought Saddam was involved in 9/11. Yet even in this counterfactual world, there still appears to be a sizable percentage that is simply uncorrectable. I conclude with evidence explaining why.

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Similar Titles:
European Pathways from September 11th: What Role for Public Opinion?

Willing to Believe: Explaining the Belief that Saddam Hussein aided with the September 11th Attacks

Saddam and September 11th: A Model for Predicting the Belief that Saddam Aided in the September 11th attacks


 
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