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Association: Name: Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p360870_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Shikano, Susumu. and Linhart, Eric. "Policy choice and portfolio allocation in coalition formation: A sequential estimation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, <Not Available>. 2009-11-10 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p360870_index.html>

Shikano, S. and Linhart, E. "Policy choice and portfolio allocation in coalition formation: A sequential estimation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL <Not Available>. 2009-11-10 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p360870_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: This paper applies Sened’s model of coalition formation (1995, 1996) to state-level data of coalition governments in Germany. The key feature of Sened’s model is that parties may vary in their degree of office versus policy motivation. While the original model contains no sequential structure, most coalition formation processes begin with bargaining over policy prior to portfolio allocation. This paper assumes that parties use backward induction to reach an optimal decision. A correspondingly structured statistical model is applied to data of German state-level coalition formations in order to estimate the weighting parameter of both motivations.

Cabinet Portfolios vs. Coalition Governments: Who Has the Power in Welfare Policy Decisions?

Coalition Formation in the German Federal States: A Synthesis of Policy and Office Motivation

Coalition Governance in Eastern Europe: How Portfolio Allocation Differs in Eastern and Western Europe