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Association: Name: Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p361591_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Shin, Jae Hyeok. "Voter Demands or Electoral System Effects?: Explaining Party Switching in the South Korean National Assembly, 1988-2008" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, <Not Available>. 2010-03-11 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p361591_index.html>

Shin, J. "Voter Demands or Electoral System Effects?: Explaining Party Switching in the South Korean National Assembly, 1988-2008" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL <Not Available>. 2010-03-11 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p361591_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: This paper explains party switching by legislators in South Korea by testing the following two theories. First, where voters prefer to receive programmatic goods to particularistic goods, legislators may think switching parties would not improve their chances of winning elections since voters seem willing to vote for the parties that promise desired programmatic goods even if the parties are not a part of the majority coalition because they know only the parties can deliver the goods. Conversely, where voters prefer particularistic goods, legislators may have a strong incentive to switch into the president's party/coalition since these voters would not expect their representatives to remain loyal to a party that doesn’t achieve power because any party can provide particularistic goods. Second, under electoral systems that encourage candidates to cultivate personal reputations rather than party reputations, sometimes their interests may conflict with party leaders’ interests. For instance, party leaders often want to divert more resources to electorally more important districts, which might harm the candidates whose districts receive few resources. Then, these candidates may want to switch to parties who promise large rewards.

The Effects of Electoral Reform on the Belgian Party System: Strategic Adaptation at the Voter and the Party Elite Level

Explaining Split-ticket Voting in the 2008 Korean General Election for the National Assembly

Voting for Whom? Impact of Electoral Systems in the Korean National Assembly