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Association: Name: Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p362191_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Bowie, Jennifer. "Under What Conditions do Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals Judges Fear Reversal from their Circuit En Banc?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, <Not Available>. 2009-11-10 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p362191_index.html>

Bowie, J. B. "Under What Conditions do Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals Judges Fear Reversal from their Circuit En Banc?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL <Not Available>. 2009-11-10 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p362191_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: The question of whether appeals court anticipate how their circuit en banc would decide their case is an important question and is one that has received to date modest empirical attention. If following relevant precedent is an important consideration and goal of an appeals court judge then why would a judge try to predict how their circuit en banc may decide their case? One argument put forth, is that judges participate in this behavior because they fear reversal and will act strategically when deciding cases. The goal of analysis is to determine whether judges behave strategically by altering their decision making in order to avoid review by their circuit en banc in cases that are more likely to be reviewed by an en banc panel. My testing strategy is two-pronged in that I use both quantitative and qualitative analyses. Quantitatively, I examine cases from the Appeals Court Database and employ a random effects logit approach. Qualitatively, I analyze interview data collected from over fifty U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals judges from all but two circuits. Preliminary results suggest that appeals court judges do decide cases differently when they fear reversal from their circuit en banc versus when they do not.

Do Federal Appeals Judges Fear Reversal from the Supreme Court?

The Conditions of Policy-Based Judging and Appellate Influence in Federal Trial Courts