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Association: Name: Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p362858_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Dwyer, Caitlin. "A Different Nominee? The Role of the Rules in the 2008 Primaries" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Apr 02, 2009 <Not Available>. 2009-11-10 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p362858_index.html>

Dwyer, C. E. , 2009-04-02 "A Different Nominee? The Role of the Rules in the 2008 Primaries" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-11-10 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p362858_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: In this paper, I ask whether voting procedures affected outcomes in the 2008 primaries. Social choice theorists have demonstrated that depending on the preference structure of voters, various procedures may lead to different results. However, most scholars illustrate this feature of elections by creating hypothetical preference structures and simulating the results of various voting procedures. In an investigation of the role of the delegate allocation rules in the 2008 Democratic and Republican primaries, I use actual votes cast to determine the delegate counts of the candidates under various allocation procedures. I find that while Obama was triumphant under proportional representation and won more contests and more total votes than Clinton, she would have been leading in delegates under a winner-take-all system. When Romney withdrew from the nomination, he would have been leading in delegates if the Republican Party had used proportional representation even though McCain had won more states, more votes overall, and was leading under the winner-take-all system. My analysis shows that the rules structuring the parties’ delegate allocation procedures influenced which candidates became the presidential candidates.

Effects of Delegate Allocation Systems on Presidential Primary Outcomes

What Do You Mean I Can Only Vote for One Party? Elite Views, Media Coverage, and Public Discourse Surrounding Washington State Primary Reform

Successor Party Adaptation in Candidate-Centered Systems: the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and the Czech Social Democratic Party in the Czech Republic