Author's Keywords: audience costs, mediation, conflict, peacemaking, information transmission, side payments, split population	Convention All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p362958_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Ramirez, Shawn. "Isolation and Evaluation of Three Mechanisms for Mediation: Information Transmission, Side Payments, and Audience Costs" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Apr 02, 2009 <Not Available>. 2009-11-10 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p362958_index.html>

Ramirez, S. L. , 2009-04-02 "Isolation and Evaluation of Three Mechanisms for Mediation: Information Transmission, Side Payments, and Audience Costs" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-11-10 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p362958_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Models of mediation condition their results upon the assumption that informational asymmetries are relieved through a mediator. However, there exists no mechanism through which this relief occurs. Bargaining models show that parties in conflict have the incentive to bluff. The addition of a mediator does not alter this incentive: disputants still prefer to exaggerate their demands, strength, or resolve to obtain their best outcome. I use a series of models, each isolating one of three mechanisms -- information transmission, side payments, and audience costs -- to identify whether and how each mechanism can lead to success. I show that the confidentiality of mediation behind closed doors allows leaders to avoid audience costs that would be paid if diplomatic concessions were made publicly. I use a split population model in which the latent dimension is audience costs on conflicts from 1950-2000 using the Archigos and Berkovitch data. I show that a selection process exists in which the domestic political situation makes certain conflicts amenable to mediation, and within those, certain factors enhance the likelihood of success. I also draw support from interviews regarding the mediation of the Peru-Ecuador border conflict.

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