|
|
|
|
Electoral Rules, Nominations Procedures, and Politicians' Incentives for Party Loyalty in 10 Mixed-Member Systems |
|
| Abstract | Word Stems | Keywords | Association | Citation | Get this Document | Similar Titles |
|
STOP! You can now view the document associated with this citation by clicking on the "View Document as HTML" link below. |
|
Click here to view the document
|
Abstract:
|
Comparative politics researchers have almost universally relied on electoral system to measure whether a politician’s primary principal is the party or constituents. However, as Carey and Shugart (1995) point out, electoral rules alone can be deceptive. Adding an understanding of who controls nomination procedures to the more easily available information on electoral system is essential for understanding a politician’s full incentive structure._x000d__x000d_I use this important addition to re-evaluate the sprawling literature on party loyalty, including party discipline and party switching. Existing literature finds inconsistent effects of electoral system on party loyalty. By examining the interaction of electoral system and nomination rules faced by different classes of politicians in 10 countries with mixed-member electoral systems, I find that party-accountable politicians are indeed more loyal than constituent-accountable politicians. In the end, I argue that who controls the nominations process is ultimately more important in determining politicians’ incentives to be loyal to a party than the formal structure of the electoral system. |
Most Common Document Word Stems:
parti (227), politician (89), nomin (87), elector (74), vote (74), smd (64), control (55), procedur (55), pr (53), system (46), disciplin (42), leader (37), polit (35), incent (35), elect (35), list (34), candid (33), nation (31), seat (29), rule (29), studi (25), |
|
 | Convention | | Submission, Review, and Scheduling! All Academic Convention can help with all of your abstract management needs and many more. Contact us today for a quote! |  | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. |  | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! |  | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! |  | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. |  | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! |  | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
Association:
Name: Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
|
Citation:
|
MLA Citation:
| Preece, Jessica. "Electoral Rules, Nominations Procedures, and Politicians' Incentives for Party Loyalty in 10 Mixed-Member Systems" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Apr 02, 2009 <Not Available>. 2009-11-10 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p363349_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Preece, J. R. , 2009-04-02 "Electoral Rules, Nominations Procedures, and Politicians' Incentives for Party Loyalty in 10 Mixed-Member Systems" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-11-10 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p363349_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Comparative politics researchers have almost universally relied on electoral system to measure whether a politician’s primary principal is the party or constituents. However, as Carey and Shugart (1995) point out, electoral rules alone can be deceptive. Adding an understanding of who controls nomination procedures to the more easily available information on electoral system is essential for understanding a politician’s full incentive structure._x000d__x000d_I use this important addition to re-evaluate the sprawling literature on party loyalty, including party discipline and party switching. Existing literature finds inconsistent effects of electoral system on party loyalty. By examining the interaction of electoral system and nomination rules faced by different classes of politicians in 10 countries with mixed-member electoral systems, I find that party-accountable politicians are indeed more loyal than constituent-accountable politicians. In the end, I argue that who controls the nominations process is ultimately more important in determining politicians’ incentives to be loyal to a party than the formal structure of the electoral system. |
Get this Document:
Find this citation or document at one or all of these locations below. The links below may have the citation or the entire document for free or you may purchase access to the document. Clicking on these links will change the site you're on and empty your shopping cart.
| Document Type: |
application/pdf |
| Page count: |
15 |
| Word count: |
6205 |
| Text sample: |
| Electoral Rules Nomination Procedures and Party Discipline in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems Jessica Preece University of California Los Angeles jrp68@ucla.edu Paper submitted for the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting April 2-5 2009 Chicago Illinois Abstract Political scientists have often relied on electoral rules to proxy for the incentives that shape politicians’ behavior. However electoral rules do not appear to be correlated with party discipline an obvious example of political behavior that should be influenced by incentives. Based on the |
| 507-523. Morgenstern Scott. 2003. Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll-Call Voting in Latin America and the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Norris Pippa. 2004. Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Samuels David J. 1999. Incentives to Cultivate a Party Vote in Candidate-centric Electoral Systems: Evidence from Brazil. Comparative Political Studies 32 no. 4 (June 1): 487-518. Thames Frank C. 2005. A House Divided: Party Strength and the Mandate Divide in Hungary Russia and Ukraine. |
Similar Titles:
Electoral Systems and Incentives to Foreign Direct Investors: A Cross-National Study
Electoral Reform After the Election of 2000: A Study of the Impact of Politics on Policy Decisions and How Those Decisions Impact the Responsiveness of the Electoral System
Political Corruption in Mixed Electoral Systems: Do Types of Party List Proportional Representation Matter?
|
|