Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper tests the proposition that material interests played a decisive role in shaping national preferences over the design of the Kyoto Protocol, the world’s first global CO2 emissions control regime. That states act to defend their material interests when negotiating international regimes has long been a bedrock assumption of international relations scholarship, and is also a widely held belief among analysts of climate politics. This paper investigates whether the preferences of national governments over a global climate treaty are correlated with measures of the material interests that may have been at stake. States should oppose a stringent climate treaty if their economic output is highly dependent on fossil fuel consumption; if the real and opportunity costs of curbing CO2 emissions are relatively low; and if their vulnerability to climate change related damages is relatively small. The empirical evidence offers only limited support for these hypotheses. At best, material interests favoring emissions abatement may be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of support for a strong climate treaty. Case studies indicate that other determinants of state preferences may include ideational factors and the configuration of political institutions.