Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: ISA 2003 Proposal Is War Rational? The Extent of Miscalculation and Misperception as Causes of War A central but often implicit debate in the causes of war literature centers on the question: is war mostly the rational and Clausewitzian pursuit of states and groups, or is it primarily the result of miscalculation and misperception? Explanations for war relying on offensive realism, expected utility theories, elite manipulation, or pre-emption all tend to be rational. On the other hand, hypernationalism, optimistic miscalculation, and the Cult of the Offensive are miscalculation and misperception explanations. Most theories about the causes of war, and most arguments about particular wars, can be parsed into either the rational camp or the miscalculation and misperception camp. Little work clashes the two sets of arguments, or spans multiple methodologies. I do this in three ways: First, miscalculation and misperception has to be defined so that they can be distinguished from a rational Clauwitzianism. Likewise, observable implications have to distinguish between the two camps. Those making miscalculation arguments must also show that the natural equilibrium of the states in question is peace. While there are many miscalculation and misperception arguments about war (Blainey, Van Evera), most proponents fail to take these steps. Second, I perform statistical analyses to get a sense of the extent of the miscalculation problem. I ask: how many war initiators lost wars, how many states started wars against more powerful states (and won or lost), how many states initially won their wars, but got balanced against and ended up losing, and so forth. When Bueno de Mesquita wrote War Trap, initiators won 42 of 58 interstate wars, leading him to argue that states generally make rational calculations when going to war. Third, case studies can answer questions including: did states and leaders accomplish their goals with war? If not, was war at least a reasonable bet; was there a reasonable theory of victory? Were these goals those that could reasonably be defined as Clausewitzian? (I use multiple criteria for rationality) If not the goals were not Clausewitzian, and/or the means seemed inefficient, what drove or colored the move toward war? My ISA paper will cover the first two issues. I will present the framework of the project and the statistical findings. So far we have found that war initiators only win 44% of the time, and lose 36% of the time (uncertain results account for the remainder). Assuming that most initiators plan on winning, they miscalculate with high frequency. Our analysis also shows when war initiators win, the average length of the war is 308 days. When they lose, duration is 660 days. This supports the arguments of Van Evera and Blainey that states start wars thinking they will be quick and cheap. When states calculate well and win, wars are indeed shorter than when they lose. To identify conditions which imply variations in miscalculation and misperception, I am analyzing such factors as: duration, presence of joiners, and relative fatality, force, and power levels.