Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Due to the stark distinction between the use of violent and nonviolent strategies, political parties and terrorist groups are seldom viewed as comparable organizations. While the first is commonly associated with the use of legitimate formal-legal strategies to obtain its goals, the latter is generally associated with the use of violence. A historical review of the strategies adopted by political parties and terrorist organizations in many parts of the world exposes a discrepancy in this reasoning. In reality, a dichotomous differentiation is incompatible with empirical evidence. An analysis of cases shows that political parties sometimes turn to violence to achieve their goals. Likewise, terrorist groups have been known to shift from violent to nonviolent strategies in some cases in order to function legitimately within established political institutions. In addition, both organizations are associated with political ambitions and the need to attract mass support. For these reasons, we discard a dichotomous differentiation between parties and terrorist groups, opting instead to treat both organizations as political groups that use different strategies under different conditions. In order to detect which factors shape the strategic decisions of political groups, we focus on the attractiveness of strategic alternatives. We present a theoretical framework that serves as the foundation for the analysis of strategic shifts by diverse political groups. We then test this framework using simple statistical procedures.