Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: How are seats allocated on the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Executive Board? Are seats determined by strategic power politics, as realists would contend; by economic and class interests, as critical theorists would argue; or by bureaucratic considerations, as organizational theorists would insist? The theoretical debate on this issue is lively, with hypothesizing taking place on every front. What is sorely lacking, however, is empirical evidence of actual practice. Developing an evidence-based understanding of the manner in which IMF member states gain access to seats at the Executive Board is particularly crucial now, given the centrality of this issue to current debates about the very future of the IMF itself. As part of a multi-case study, this paper will present historical context to this current policy dilemma, illustrating the political process involved in getting a seat at the Executive Board. This research will also build methodological bridges between the various theoretical paradigms used to examine decision-making bodies in international organizations. The core of the project will be an analysis of the process of IMF Executive Board seat allocation, with special focus on four countries that have gained seats since the late 1970s: Saudi Arabia (1978), China (1980), Russia (1992), and Switzerland (1992). The addition of these particular seats expanded the IMF Executive Board from the 20 mandated by the IMF’s Articles of Agreement to its current 24 seat composition. Why did the IMF Executive Board expand beyond its mandated number to include these members? Through a rigorous comparative political-historical analysis, this study will put the IMF’s technical, rules-based argument for how seats are allocated to the test. The project uses content-analysis of the IMF’s own internal Archive documents (including Executive Board minutes, staff technical studies, and Board decisions); of declassified US government documents acquired using Freedom of Information Act requests from the State and Treasury Departments, and of transcripts of personal interviews with IMF staff, Executive Directors, US officials, other governments’ officials, and policy insiders.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Addressing the rise of terrorism as a global threat has become a top priority for governments throughout the world. Yet the presence of an issue on a policy agenda, no matter how salient the issue, cannot explain how policies are subsequently processed and adopted. For that explanation, scholars must look at the interface between new agenda issues and pre-existing institutions, interests, and ideas. This paper proposes to examine the case of counter-terrorism policy in the European Union through the lens of bureaucratic politics. Different bureaucratic organizations within government often "see" issues in different ways, thus influencing the definition of the problem and the search for solutions. Preliminary research in the EU case suggests the presence of pre-existing "policy frames", or social constructions of a particular issue, within the EU administration that mediate how terrorism as an agenda item has been addressed. Using in-depth interviews and documentary analysis, we propose to map the presence of different EU-level policy frames related to counter-terrorism. Drawing from the literature on policy framing, agenda setting, new institutionalism, and bureaucratic politics, we will then explore the prospects for policy change as the result of frame change or convergence.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper traces how Canada's engagement with failed and fragile states has been shaped by shifts in the relative power and influence of Canada's foreign affairs and defence departments. The paper argues that, despite the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's (DFAIT) rhetorical commitment to benevolent norms for intervention in fragile and failed states, Canada's approach to these states has been co-opted and recast by the Department of National Defence (DND), which is using the discourse of failed and fragile states to promote a Canadian participation in the war on terror, justify increased defence spending, and bolster the case for the maintenance and deployment of combat-capable armed forces. In its 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS), the Canadian government declared that "Among the greatest contemporary security threats are those resulting from a large number of fragile and poorly governed states." Meant to unify Canada's future diplomatic, development, and defence activities under a single set of policy objectives, the IPS's focus on fragile and failed states represented a rare instance of rhetorical harmony between the DFAIT and DND. By expressing their shared commitment to address failed and fragile states, the two departments appeared to have bridged their recognized disagreements over the direction of Canadian international affairs. In practice, however, this has not led to unified policies or a harmonious approach to the problem. The consensus, if ever there really was one, has failed. Current bureaucratic relations and policies reflect the defence department's ascendancy. Due to the Canadian government's current focus on the war on terror, rebuilding the Canadian Armed Forces, and strengthening relations with the United States, DND's reading of the fragile and failed state problematic has dominated and supplanted DFAIT's. Though DFAIT and the public pronouncements of the defence department still emphasize an approach to failed and fragile states that reflects benevolent norms, these declarations have been reduced to 'window dressing'. Due to the Canadian government's current focus on the war on terror, rebuilding the Canadian Armed Forces, and strengthening relations with the United States, DND's reading of the fragile and failed state problematic has dominated and supplanted DFAIT's.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: For those who must import oil to maintain their economies and quality of life, any disruption in the delivery of imported oil is a highly threatening prospect. How would U.S. policy makers react to such a threat in the contemporary era? We examine the potential policy-making roles and impacts of bureaucratic actors operating at the intersection of energy and security issues. To do so, we employ a comparative approach using an original simulation that envisions an energy supply ‘crisis’ in the United States due to events in a hypothetical state somewhat inspired by Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. The simulation is run at three very different universities, and the results are surprisingly similar. Despite the obvious security implications of an oil shortage in a time of war, we find more engaged roles for those representing non-military bureaucracies, a greater reliance on diplomatic and economic tools to respond to the crisis, and less reliance on military policy instruments than might have been the case in the past.