Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: There exists a widespread perception that the recurrent and cascading episodes of ethnic cleansing witnessed in the Balkans in the 1990s represented something new and novel. However, the uncomfortable fact is that both states and non-state actors have long utilized population displacement as a tactical weapon against their adversaries. In the context of counter-insurgency operations, states have been particularly prone to use “regroupment camps” or “strategic hamlets” in order to—in Mao’s terms—“drain the sea” of water (civilians) to expose and kill the fish (guerrillas). Nevertheless, despite the frequency of its employment, the historical evidence on the efficacy of regroupment as a tactical weapon is mixed at best. in short, evidence suggests that—except under a very circumscribed set of conditions—the long-term political and military costs of using forced migration as a tool of counter-insurgency tend to outweigh the short-term military benefits.

The continued pervasiveness of population relocation in counterinsurgency operations in the face of myriad failures raises several obvious questions: First, why does it remain such a popular tactic, despite its problematic track record? Second, given that relocation schemes sometimes do succeed, is there a potentially generalizable theory about the conditions under which they will succeed and fail that can explain divergent outcomes? If so, what are these conditions? Or, alternatively—as some have argued—must each insurgency be viewed sui generis? Using evidence from a variety of historical counterinsurgency operations—over time and across the globe—this paper proposes two sets of hypotheses to answer these questions and offers some preliminary tests of them.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: There exists a widespread perception that the recurrent and cascading episodes of ethnic cleansing witnessed in the Balkans in the 1990s represented something new and novel. However, the uncomfortable fact is that both states and non-state actors have long utilized population displacement as a tactical weapon against their adversaries. In the context of counter-insurgency operations, states have been particularly prone to use “regroupment camps” or “strategic hamlets” in order to—in Mao’s terms—“drain the sea” of water (civilians) to expose and kill the fish (guerrillas). Nevertheless, despite the frequency of its employment, the historical evidence on the efficacy of regroupment as a tactical weapon in counterinsurgency operations is mixed at best. In fact, evidence suggests that—except under a very circumscribed set of conditions—the long-term political and military costs of using population regroupment as a tool of counter-insurgency tend to outweigh the short-term military benefits. In fact, while there have been some noteworthy relocation successes—e.g., the British in Malaya in the q950s—more often than not, population relocation schemes actually backfire, galvanizing support for insurgents rather than their opponents.

Drawing upon existing literatures on social revolutions, foreign policy decision-making, and behavioral psychology—as well as evidence from myriad counterinsurgency operations since the start of the 20th century—this paper offers two sets of hypotheses. One set seeks to explain why population relocation remains a common feature of counter-insurgency operations, despite its problematic track record. A second set proposes an explanation as to why—and under what conditions—population relocation schemes will succeed or fail in their objectives. Historical cases examined include the Boer War, the Malaya Emergency, the Mau Mau Revolt, the Huk Rebellion, the French-Algerian War, the Vietnam War, and the wars for Angola and Mozambique. More contemporary cases are also examined, including recent or ongoing civil conflicts in Guatemala, Burundi, and Kurdistan.