Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: It has been argued that direct public funding of political parties is a catalyst of democratization and consolidation processes, both by leveling the playing field among competitors, and contributing to limit the abuse of state resources by the incumbent(s). However, in older democracies it has been criticized for the rent-seeking incentives it generates, as well as for its potential for decreasing political competitiveness. This paper integrates these perspectives into a dynamic theory of public funding of political parties, stressing the diverse effects it may have on party system development, and the role played by partisan incentives and opportunities in the implementation of this regulatory instrument. It tests some of the hypotheses derived from the theory using a database from sub-national politics in Mexico, and illustrates the theoretical insights through a narrative of the Mexican federal party finance enforcement system—itself a showcase of how both these allegedly “new” and “old” incentives may coexist.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Teaching public management to undergraduate students is challenging. This paper examines one such attempt: to explain public management to undergraduate political science students enrolled in an introductory public administration course. In recent decades, much has been written about managing the public sector more like a business and less like a government. Government management is generally termed wasteful and paper focuses less on how to teach public management in the public interest to undergraduates and more on what should be taught about public management in the public interest. In order to accomplish this goal the paper does three things: 1) it defines public management, 2) describes several competing theories of public management, 3) explains how the New Public Service is applied to various public management situations and realities, and 4) offers conclusions and implications for teaching and research in public management.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: "Laws and government may be considered in this and indeed in every case as a combination of the rich to oppress the poor," said Adam Smith in his Lectures on Jurisprudence in 1763. In these lectures he also, however, was concerned with "the principall of common or generall interest" and in The Wealth of Nations he enumerated a range of government expenditures that were justified because they were "laid out for the general benefit of the whole society." In similar fashion, in the works of writers in the tradition of historical materialism the relationship between general or public interests and sectional or class interests is more complicated than is often assumed. In the paper I examine how a selection of thinkers in political economy and historical materialism have dealt with this problem, including, in addition to Smith, Marx and Engels, Karl Polanyi, Robert W. Cox, Nicos Poulantzas and Robert Gilpin. I argue that a serious theoretical issue is at stake that is highly relevant for the analysis of international and global political institutions and policies. Further I suggest a possible solution based on 1) the duality of all political institutions, serving both general and sectional interests, and 2) a Bohr-inspired philosophical notion of complementarity as a productive way of handling this duality in social science inquiry.

Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: Mancur Olson in “The Logic of Collective Action” presents an analysis of the freerider problem faced by groups that provide a public good. His analysis is explicitly limited to the collective action problem in economic interest groups, such as unions and business associations. Olson specifically notes that his analysis does not apply to philanthropic organizations. In recent years, Walker (1991) and others have documented a substantial growth in what are called public interest groups, such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International and Common Cause. These public interest groups are examples of Olson’s philanthropic groups because their goal is helping others or society in general, rather than solely benefitting the members of the group.
I propose an explanation of how public interest groups solve their collective action problem by modifying Olson’s analysis. First, I modify the underlying rational, self-interested axiom by incorporating weak altruistic motives to individuals. Second, I analyze the game as one of incomplete information. Third, benefit provided is not the traditional public good, rather it is a “bi-public good.”
I incorporate these three features into a formal model of voluntary contributions to the provision of a public good. I show that a Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists which provides for positive contributions to the public good. My solution is different from that of Ainsworth and Sened (1993) who analyze the collective action problem of interest groups by modeling it as a signaling game with an entrepreneur. Their model is based upon Palfrey and Rosenthal’s (1984, 1988) analysis of the voluntary provision of a discrete, public good. However, Ainsworth and Sened’s analysis applies only where there are no competing interest groups (a rarity in the political process). My analysis explicitly models the provision of a “bi-public good” when there are competing interest groups over a good that is simultaneously good and bad for different groups.
In the second half of the analysis, I test the theoretical model. I use the 2004 GSS analysis of altruism as the instrument for my tests. I find strong support for the hypothesis. Membership in economic groups is not correlated with altruism, i.e., selective benefits are sufficient. But, membership in groups advocating social or political causes is correlated with altruistic motivation. In addition, contributing of money to social and political causes is correlated with altruistic behavior.