Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: With the establishment of the NPT regime, the so-called “nuclear taboo” has become implicitly institutionalized to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. Yet, there has been increasing concern about the erosion of the NPT regime due to noncompliance with the Treaty’s nonproliferation obligations by some states “of concern,” notably North Korea and Iran, seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Another set of challenges is the lack of political commitment of major powers to follow their disarmament obligations in addition to the double standard they apply to pursue their national interests that often violate the object and purpose of the Treaty. What effects does the NPT regime have on curbing the nuclear ambition of “rogue states”? Is the NPT regime strong enough to withstand challenges posed by international power politics? Or does power trump norm? Here, the focus of interest is on why and under what conditions rules and norms of the regime are violated by some states of concern. This research also seeks to shed light on how to explain the differences in the outcomes of the nuclear nonproliferation negotiations between the major powers and “rogue states” within the framework of the NPT regime.