Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper argues that the pursuit of nuclear weapons is a rational response for states living in unfavorable security environments and that, as such, it cannot be incentivised away as most of the proliferation literature encourages. The paper compares Iran, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel and finds in each case a similar rationale for nuclear acquisition. Each state faces numerically and (except Israel) conventionally superior military forces and compromised geographic location vis-a-vis the most likely potential adversary. All states have sought to acquire nuclear weapons in order to increase their otherwise weak deterrent capability.This paper argues that because states prioritize security risks higher than other political values, no combination of incentives, economic or otherwise, will dissuade these states from their nuclear ambitions. Consequently, the challenge for the international system should not be on how to prevent them from acquiring nuclear weapons, but rather on how to manage existence in a world with a multiplicity of nuclear powers.Drawing on lessons from the Cold War, this paper presents several policy recommendations on how to manage a proliferated world, including the importance of diplomatic channels between adversaries and developing enhanced technology for the identification of nuclear material both before and after detonation (to reduce the likelihood of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorist groups of third parties).This paper takes a different tack than most proliferation literature. Most proliferation literature attempts to create incentives to dissuade nuclear aspirants from further pursuing their goal. This paper is distinguished by its recognition of the inherently rational pursuit of nuclear weapons by security deprived states and its proposal of specific policies to minimize the risks of living in a more widely proliferated world.