Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Author 1:
Anthony Fleming
PhD Candidate
West Virginia University
1057 Takoma Street Morgantown WV, 26505
Home Phone: 304-599-1642
Cell Phone: 304-549-2517
Sjtfadd0@aol.com
Advisor: Donley Studlar
dstudlar@wvu.edu

Author 2:
Sara Moats
PhD Candidate
West Virginia University
971 Valley View Ave.
Home Phone: 304-677-2357
Fax: 304-265-6036
sara.moats@mail.wvu.edu
Advisor: Donley Studlar
dstudlar@wvu.edu

Author 3:
Paul Rutledge
PhD Candidate
West Virginia University
Per126@psu.edu
Advisor: Robert Diclerico

International policy is dependent on a number of factors. Non-Governmental and Intergovernmental organizations have a tremendous effect on policy. The domestic agenda also highly effects policy. We theorize that states that have a large number of arms manufacturers will have more association with NGOs and IGOs, and as a result will have a more liberal arms trade policy. A state with NGO and IGO involvement that doesn’t have many or any gun manufacturers will be likely to favor a more restrictive arms control policy. Another aspect of our theory suggests that third world states with high poverty will likely join certain NGOs and IGOs to obtain arms easily, if they join one of these organizations at all.
Preliminary conclusions suggest that NGO and IGO activity is driven by domestic interests. This would suggest states operate within the constraints of a two-level game. Using theories drawn from comparative agenda setting we theorize that the ways in which governments set the agenda greatly effects the state’s membership in IGOs and NGOs dealing with small arms trade. We feel this is a contribution to the field of political science because it helps one understand a states relationship with NGOs and IGOs, it also aids in the understanding of how domestic interests drive international policy choices.