Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In this paper, I ask whether voting procedures affected outcomes in the 2008 primaries. Social choice theorists have demonstrated that depending on the preference structure of voters, various procedures may lead to different results. However, most scholars illustrate this feature of elections by creating hypothetical preference structures and simulating the results of various voting procedures. In an investigation of the role of the delegate allocation rules in the 2008 Democratic and Republican primaries, I use actual votes cast to determine the delegate counts of the candidates under various allocation procedures. I find that while Obama was triumphant under proportional representation and won more contests and more total votes than Clinton, she would have been leading in delegates under a winner-take-all system. When Romney withdrew from the nomination, he would have been leading in delegates if the Republican Party had used proportional representation even though McCain had won more states, more votes overall, and was leading under the winner-take-all system. My analysis shows that the rules structuring the parties’ delegate allocation procedures influenced which candidates became the presidential candidates.