Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Downs predicts that presidential candidates will positions their platforms at the median. What
does this mean for party platforms? Are we to expect them to be placed at the median as well, or
farther toward the poles, in order to pander to party loyalists? We investigate these questions
theoretically, formally, and empirically, and argue that parties view interest groups as a means to
mobilize voters, while interest groups view parties and their platforms as a means to articulate
interests. A formal theoretical model derives the conditions under which parties would choose to
diverge from the median and articulate an interest group’s position in its platform, and an
empirical analysis further shows that parties give platform concessions to ideologues positioned
away from the median, to groups that offer a credible threat of exit to the opposition party, and to
groups that can credibly claim to mobilize voters. Both models account for a group’s ability to
mobilize voters, including size, party loyalty, and ideology. Data are derived from content
analysis of Democratic Party platforms and platform hearing testimony from interest groups in
1996, 2000, and 2004. Results show that interest groups can capture parties and their platforms
and mold the platform to reflect their views. Parties are compliant because they rely on groups
to help turn out voters.