Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Using a newly-assembled data set, this paper studies the relationship between regime type and defense effort, primarily defined as the defense burden. Consistent with liberal theories, regime type has a statistically significant effect: democracies spend proportionately less on defense than other states. In addition, having democratic neighbors also tends to reduce a state’s defense burden. These findings have theoretical implications for the democratic peace proposition in particular and for the effect of domestic politics on foreign policy in general. A related finding is that during times of war, democracies spend as much or more of GDP on the military as do non-democracies. This is also consistent with findings of the democratic peace literature in that democracies tend to fight wars that are popularly supported, and to win the wars they fight. All other things being equal, the arsenal of democracy may out-gun its opponents. The findings add support to the institutional explanation of the democratic peace because it appears to be popular sentiment, expressed through elections and other democratic institutions, that constrains elites during peacetime and allows them to spend more during wartime. This is consistent with Bueno de Mesquita, et al.’s (1999) institutional “public goods” interpretation of the democratic peace. It also appears that mixed regimes and authoritarian regimes are less able than liberal states to adapt their budgets to meet urgent needs (such as war).