Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The concept of the "modern presidency" is the dominant analytical construct in contemporary presidential scholarship. The conventional wisdom describes the "modern presidency" as an institution with more political authority and autonomy than its "traditional" nineteenth century predecessor. This paper questions the utility of this bifurcated paradigm by examining how three lesser-known "pre-modern" presidents (John Tyler, James Polk, Rutherford Hayes) created new forms of executive authority and increased their institutional autonomy. We begin with a consideration of Terry Moe's (1985) suggestion that modern presidents are distinguished by their incentive to "politicize" and "centralize." We contend, on the contrary, that this is not a distinctly modern phenomenon: presidents throughout American history have "politicized" and "centralized." This behavior is not due to Moe's "politics of structural choice," but to the ambiguous definition of executive power in the Constitution. We also build upon Harvey Mansfield's theory of executive power in Taming the Prince (1993), demonstrating that an ambivalent, yet pervasive, institutional incentive encourages presidents to pursue authority not explicitly granted to them. In our case studies, we demonstrate that the tendency for presidents to actively claim authority and seek out reliable resources for the exercise of power is neither distinctly modern nor particularly extraordinary. Rather, it is a common tendency that finds its roots in the peculiar, ambiguous form of executive power in America. We intend our paper to be a first step towards the development of a historically informed and theory-driven research agenda that transcends the "modern-traditional" frame of analysis.