Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: Corruption may be seen as a deficiency in the behavior of individuals, but it is shaped by historical and institutional forces. The study examines corruption at the societal level and examines how it interacts with governance and development. The focus is post-communist countries with in-depth analysis of Romania.
The study highlights four elements needed for successful anti-corruption reform and development of democratic public service in post-communist countries. High standards are needed either supported by societal values or an external source. The top leadership in government must support reform. Middle and lower-level administrators must act in ways that are consistent with reform, either on their own volition or because their behavior is being monitored. The fourth element for successful reform is widespread public perception that government is accountable, transparent, and ethical.
The empirical focus of this study is a two-country comparison on indicators of “good governance”. The concept of “governance” is measured through the Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshots from the Governance Group of the World Bank Institute, Governance and Anti-Corruption program. The data comes in form of six aggregate indicators corresponding to six basic governance concepts: voice and accountability, political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, and control of corruption. The study contrasts Czech Republic, an already member of the European Union which is considered a “very successful” reformer by the transition and enlargement literature, with Romania – an “acceding” country to the European Union. The enlargement literature considers Romania a laggard in the transition process. Romania signed the Accession treaty in April this year but is not yet a member of the European Union.
I compare Czech Republic and Romania for the period 1996-2004 on the six clusters of governance and examine changes over time. The argument in the transition literature is that “starting points” shaped by legacies of the past (e.g., experience with democracy between the Wars, level of opposition to the communist regime, the quality of political competition at the critical juncture of regime change in 1989) are conducive to where a country will stay in the years to come. I compare Czech Republic and Romania and see whether the “liberal” and “illiberal” patterns of change respectively, displayed in the early years of the transition period were also conducive to the amplitude of changes undertaken and progress/ or regress being made between 1996 and 2004 on the six governance indicators.
Between 1996 and 2004, except a slight increase in the quality of Rule of Law Czech Republic has made negative shifts in all the other governance indicators. In contrast, if one controls for the starting point Romania had regressed only in two of the indicators, Political Stability and Control of Corruption. On all the rest Romania had made progress (i.e., positive shifts). Romania scored much better than Czech Republic on the Control of Corruption indicator, and even though both countries had regressed on this measure Romanian negative shift is smaller than the Czech negative shift.
The findings suggest that despite the illiberal pattern of change exhibited in the first years of “building democracy”, Romania has practically made more progress in all clusters of governance compared to Czech Republic except in the area of political stability. The very different “starting points” between the two countries deem Romania to be left behind regardless of the positive changes it makes on the governance indicators. However, the evidence suggests that if one examines the actual changes throughout the years, one sees that Romania has actually made quite a lot of progress, especially when compared to another post-communist transition country - Czech Republic which is considered “very successful” in implementing reforms by Western experts. The findings enhance the prospects that the current reforms in Romania will have a positive impact.
The final part of the study offers an assessment of the ongoing anti-corruption reforms in Romania explicitly linked to the comparative indicators from the data. I return to the four elements needed for successful reform. First, high standards are needed in Romania, and these are provided by the European Union. Second, in the current anti-corruption 2005-2007 strategy, it appears that top leaders in the Romanian government have made an unconditional commitment to support reform. Middle and lower-level administrators have yet to prove that they act in ways that are consistent with reform, especially in customs, police, and sale of licenses to private actors. These administrative changes are closely linked to the public perception in Romania which is lagging and has not recognized a reduction in corruption. Ironically, the citizens encourage the continuation of corruption at the middle and low-level administration by assuming that bribes are necessary. Thus the fourth and last element needed for successful reform in Romania is widespread change in public perception that government is accountable and ethical.