Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Do legislators� cognitive limitations affect which lobbyists they listen to and which advocacy arguments they accept or reject? In this paper I report my findings from an original experiment that simulates how lobbyists communicate with members of Congress. I recruited 139 Washington-based staff in House and Senate personal and committee offices to participate in an �in-box� simulation that asked them to learn about several policy issues and recommend a hypothetical health care policy agenda for the 110th Congress. The experiment is a 2 x 2 repeated-measures design with four experimental conditions. The experiment includes two within-subjects factors: (1) Advocacy Argument Quality and (2) Interest Group Credibility. The first factor is the qualitative nature of the advocacy argument�normative or instrumental�conveyed by a hypothetical interest group coalition. The second factor is the homogeneity of organizations that comprise the coalitions, with homogeneous coalitions being credible and heterogeneous coalitions non-credible. The point of the repeated-measures design was to nullify the alternative hypothesis that policy decisions are based entirely on pre-existing issue preferences. I am able to reject the null hypotheses and support my theory that legislative policymakers use argument quality and interest group credibility as cognitive heuristics when making decisions about policy priorities. I discuss the implications of my findings for the lobbying as legislative subsidy model and the deliberative theory of interest representation.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper examines the strategic context of interest groups' informational lobbying in Congress by determining whether groups adjust their lobbying messages whether they are lobbying the House or the Senate. Using a dataset of 182 Congressional hearings held on two new technology policy issues and two established policy issues between 1985-2004, I coded groups' hearing testimonies for whether they provided political or policy information to Congressional committees. I argue that interest groups' informational lobbying strategies change when the polictical, policy, timing and institutional contextx change. While previous studies have found that policy information is most important in interest group lobbying (Wright 1996, Esterling 2004, Nownes 2006, Hansen 1991), recent research has found that industry and citizen interest groups adjust their lobbying strategies over time based on changes in policy and political contexts (McQuide 2007, McQuide 2008). This paper looks at another context of informational lobbying, institutional contexts, by finding whether industry and citizen groups take into account the institutional differences between the House and Senate when lobbying Congress. The findings from this project will advance our understanding of the dynamic nature of interest group lobbying and the key contexts that affect interest groups' lobbying strategies in Congress.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper evaluates the information theory of interest group influence by examining the use of political and policy information by new technology and existing issue interest groups in Congressional hearings over an extended period of time (1985-2004). Previous literature has asserted that interest groups provide valuable policy information to members of Congress and that this information influences policymaking (i.e. Hansen 1991, Wright 1996). I argue that interest groups� policy information influence is limited to when the issue area is new and complex (policy context) and when the political conditions favor policy information (political context). As part of a larger dissertation project, I examine biotechnology, computer technology, agriculture and chemical industry groups� use of information over time using the ATLAS.ti 5.0 qualitative research software to code interest group oral testimonies in 182 Congressional hearings held during the 1985-2004 period. I find that new technology groups offer substantially more policy information than older issue groups while older issues groups offer more political information during Congressional hearings. In addition, I find that interest groups� use of information in Congressional hearings is not fixed; interest groups adjust their informational lobbying strategies over time as policy and political circumstances change. My research will contribute to an increased understanding of when interest groups are influential, how interest groups adjust their information strategies in response to changing political and policy conditions as well as the role of information in Congressional hearings.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In a re-evaluation of the conditional lobbying thesis, we suggest that what often is viewed as “lobbying” is in fact information coordination between motivated members and interested lobbyists.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In this paper, I develop a theory of lobbying influence that concentrates on the information processing behavior of individual lawmakers. Borrowing insights from behavioral theories of decision making, I contend that individual lawmakers adopt either compensatory or noncompensatory choice strategies. I differentiate these strategies by three information search behaviors: the sequence of information that legislators systematically consume, the amount of information they actively seek out, and the level of attention they allocate to various information sources and cues.

I empirically examine these characteristics of legislators� information search behavior by recruiting 139 congressional staffers to participate in a hypothetical in-box information board experiment. The simulation includes both internal sources to Congress, such as Dear Colleague letters and Congressional Research Service reports, and external sources from hypothetical lobbying coalitions that represent either materialist or post-materialist interests. I use process-tracing methods to determine when and why people adopt certain decision strategies (Ford et al 1989; Mintz 1993; Lau 1995, 1997). I find that legislators tend to seek for information that (1) confirms explicit partisan and implicit ideological preferences and (2) varies according to their professional orientation toward policy or electoral politics.

My findings suggest that information-subsidy models of lobbying that assume legislators to be information processing �black boxes� need to be revisited. Rather, legislative decision making � and therefore lobbying influence � ought to be theorized as adaptive. Accordingly, I introduce a new theory of informational lobbying that accounts for both the external political environment and the internal cognitive predispositions of the lawmaker.