Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: ISA 2003 Proposal Is War Rational? The Extent of Miscalculation and Misperception as Causes of War A central but often implicit debate in the causes of war literature centers on the question: is war mostly the rational and Clausewitzian pursuit of states and groups, or is it primarily the result of miscalculation and misperception? Explanations for war relying on offensive realism, expected utility theories, elite manipulation, or pre-emption all tend to be rational. On the other hand, hypernationalism, optimistic miscalculation, and the Cult of the Offensive are miscalculation and misperception explanations. Most theories about the causes of war, and most arguments about particular wars, can be parsed into either the rational camp or the miscalculation and misperception camp. Little work clashes the two sets of arguments, or spans multiple methodologies. I do this in three ways: First, miscalculation and misperception has to be defined so that they can be distinguished from a rational Clauwitzianism. Likewise, observable implications have to distinguish between the two camps. Those making miscalculation arguments must also show that the natural equilibrium of the states in question is peace. While there are many miscalculation and misperception arguments about war (Blainey, Van Evera), most proponents fail to take these steps. Second, I perform statistical analyses to get a sense of the extent of the miscalculation problem. I ask: how many war initiators lost wars, how many states started wars against more powerful states (and won or lost), how many states initially won their wars, but got balanced against and ended up losing, and so forth. When Bueno de Mesquita wrote War Trap, initiators won 42 of 58 interstate wars, leading him to argue that states generally make rational calculations when going to war. Third, case studies can answer questions including: did states and leaders accomplish their goals with war? If not, was war at least a reasonable bet; was there a reasonable theory of victory? Were these goals those that could reasonably be defined as Clausewitzian? (I use multiple criteria for rationality) If not the goals were not Clausewitzian, and/or the means seemed inefficient, what drove or colored the move toward war? My ISA paper will cover the first two issues. I will present the framework of the project and the statistical findings. So far we have found that war initiators only win 44% of the time, and lose 36% of the time (uncertain results account for the remainder). Assuming that most initiators plan on winning, they miscalculate with high frequency. Our analysis also shows when war initiators win, the average length of the war is 308 days. When they lose, duration is 660 days. This supports the arguments of Van Evera and Blainey that states start wars thinking they will be quick and cheap. When states calculate well and win, wars are indeed shorter than when they lose. To identify conditions which imply variations in miscalculation and misperception, I am analyzing such factors as: duration, presence of joiners, and relative fatality, force, and power levels.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: ISA 2006 ProposalIs War Rational? The Extent of Miscalculation and Misperception as Causes of WarA central but often implicit debate in the causes of war literature centers on the question: is war mostly the rational and Clausewitzian pursuit of states and groups, or is it primarily the result of miscalculation and misperception? Explanations for war relying on offensive realism, expected utility theories, elite manipulation, or pre-emption all tend to be rational. On the other hand, hypernationalism, optimistic miscalculation, and the ?Cult of the Offensive? are miscalculation and misperception explanations. Most theories about the causes of war, and most arguments about particular wars, can be parsed into either the rational camp or the miscalculation and misperception camp. Little work clashes the two sets of arguments, or spans multiple methodologies. I do this in three ways:First, miscalculation and misperception has to be defined so that they can be distinguished from a rational Clauwitzianism. Likewise, observable implications have to distinguish between the two camps. Those making miscalculation arguments must also show that the natural equilibrium of the states in question is peace. While there are many miscalculation and misperception arguments about war (Blainey, Van Evera), most proponents fail to take these steps.Second, I perform statistical analyses to get a sense of the extent of the miscalculation problem. I ask: how many war initiators lost wars, how many states started wars against more powerful states (and won or lost), how many states initially won their wars, but got balanced against and ended up losing, and so forth. When Bueno de Mesquita wrote War Trap, initiators won 42 of 58 interstate wars, leading him to argue that states generally make rational calculations when going to war.My ISA paper will present the framework of the project and the statistical findings. We find that war initiators only win 33% of the time since 1945, compared to 77% during the 1800s. Assuming that most initiators plan on winning, states miscalculate with increasing frequency. Our analysis also shows when war initiators win, the average length of the war is 308 days. When they lose, duration is 660 days. This supports the arguments of Van Evera and Blainey that states start wars thinking they will be quick and cheap. When states calculate well and win, wars are indeed shorter than when they lose. To identify conditions which imply variations in miscalculation and misperception, I am analyzing such factors as: duration, presence of joiners, and relative fatality, force, and power levels. I will be well into Phase II of this project by Spring 2006, and will have conducted a number of analyses to help explain why the win rate has declined so dramatically.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This study aims to help answer the question: Is war a rational, deliberate, Clausewitzian pursuit of states and groups, or is war more often caused by miscalculation and misperception? Assumptions about the extent of rationality underlie policy debates on subjects ranging from deterrence and missile defense to peacekeeping. The rationality assumption also creates a large but mostly implicit scholarly debate about the causes of war. Many realists and rational choice analysts fall into the Clausewitzian camp, while political psychologists and students of bureaucratic and organizational politics fall into the miscalculation and misperception camp.
Debates about the rationality of war remain implicit for methodological, substantive, ideological, and ‘ivory tower’ reasons. Rational choice, large-N statistical, and case study scholars often ignore or are outright hostile to each other. Scholars argue for their position more than they weigh and test arguments and counterarguments from other ideological and methodological camps.
Thus, despite the manifest scholarly and public policy importance of the “Is War Rational” question, few studies weigh and test rationality versus miscalculation and misperception as causes of war. Using a variety of methods, this study has begun to conduct these tests, and join these debates.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Is war a rational, well-calculated pursuit of states, or is war more often caused by miscalculation and misperception? Assumptions about the extent of rationality underlie policy debates on subjects ranging from deterrence to missile defense. The rationality assumption also divides theorists and theories on the causes of war into two camps. For example, many realists and expected utility theorists fall into the rationalist camp, while political psychologists and students of bureaucratic politics fall into the miscalculation and misperception camp. Despite this schism, few studies empirically test the overall extent of rationality in decisions for war. Using our “Is War Rational?” database, we find that prior to 1900, war initiators won over seventy percent of the time. Since 1945, only about one-third of initiators win. Assuming that states initiate wars planning to win, the utility of war has declined dramatically, and miscalculation and misperception have come to dominate decisions for war. Deterrence is getting harder. The utility of rationalist approaches to the causes of war is decreasing. Causes of miscalculation and misperception deserve more study.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Is war a rational pursuit? Pre-1900, war initiators won 73% of wars. Since 1945, the win rate is 33%. Assuming that states initiate wars planning to win, war?s utility is declining. Miscalculation and misperception now dominate decisions for war.