Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Group influence is an important element of study within political science. How much influence do organized interests exert within the policy process? Is this influence a normatively “good” thing, i.e., linking citizens to government? Or is it a “bad” thing? This study steps back and examines the question from the perspective of how groups might use their resources to influence public policy. I do so not at the legislative or agenda-setting phase of public policy, but at the implementation of policy, where agency officials have discretion to design rules and negotiate agreements without the scrutiny of elected officials. I argue that groups are active in securing the benefits or ameliorating the effects of legislation and devise cooperative or conflictual strategies to affect this process.

Measuring cooperation along a continuum, I argue the degree of cooperation groups exhibit is affected by the policy context, in addition to group resources. The policy context shapes the relative degree of information and access available to groups. Groups lacking access and specialized information regarding the process will fight the process more visibly than those groups with these resources.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Do resource transfers from the central government to sub-national governments affect local and national electoral contests? While scholars tend to assume the answer is “Yes”, there is surprisingly little empirical testing of this assumption, particularly with modern statistical methods. Because politics almost always matters for the allocation of public resources, an endogeneity problem plagues most studies of this topic. The key innovation of this project is to use a quasi-experimental approach to provide evidence of the effectiveness of resource transfers in buying votes. The source of variation in transfers stems from thresholds in a population-based revenue-sharing mechanism between the federal and local governments in Brazil. These thresholds create discontinuities in federal per capita transfers to local governments from 1982 until 1988 (cumulatively equal to approximately 20% of annual local GDP), which we exploit to estimate effects on local electoral outcomes using a regression-discontinuity (RD) design. While we expected additional resources to increase the local incumbent party’s re-election probability in 1988 mayoral elections, regardless of party affiliation, we find no evidence of this. When we divide our sample, however, into municipalities governed by left-wing and right-wing parties in 1982, we find that the transfers bolstered the probabilities of left-wing incumbents, not right-wing ones. Given that the 1988 elections were the first truly democratic local elections in Brazil after two decades of military rule, it may be difficult to infer from these findings to other elections. The findings, however, have interesting implications for first democratic elections.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper explores why countries differ in the timing of adopting neoliberal reform in their telecommunication industry in 18 affluent democracies between 1982 and 2002. Using the discrete-time event history analysis, it examines the effects on liberalization in telecommunications of economic globalization, economic interests, sector performance, domestic political institutions, and political party power. Liberalization is defined as introducing market competition in a long-distance telephone market. The study finds that economic interests and right party power respectively increases the adoption of neoliberal reform. However, the effects of these factors are significantly moderated during the 1990s, compared to the 1980s. The effects of domestic political institutions, leftist party power, and economic globalization are not supported.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal (CT) is currently an independent institutional actor in Peru’s politics. By comparing and contrasting the recent history of the CT and two ‘cases’ of ‘failed’ constitutional courts -the CT’s role during the Fujimori regime and the case of its predecessor, the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees- I test several theories that aim to explain the emergence of independent courts in democracies. My cases provide evidence in support of theories that highlight the importance of political pluralism as a necessary condition for the emergence of independent courts, but the cases also show that an institutional design that ‘mirrors’ this pluralism is crucial for this outcome. The importance of these political and institutional factors suggests that it is too soon to be optimistic about the likelihood that the CT can maintain its independence in the future.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Does the existence of a structural adjustment agreement with the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) cause loan recipient governments to become more repressive? This research project accounts for loan selection criteria when estimating the human rights consequences of structural adjustment. Empirically, this project significantly advances our understanding of the human rights effects of structural adjustment by estimating the joint effects of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment agreements on loan recipients. Almost all the previous research on the economic and political effects of structural adjustment has focused exclusively on the International Monetary Fund. Using a global, comparative analysis for the 1982-2001 period, the effects of structural adjustment on government respect for citizens’ rights to freedom from torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing and disappearances were examined. The findings show that implementation of structural adjustment agreements worsens government respect for all four personal integrity rights.