Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Can international crises help to push long-term rivals toward peace? If so, how and under what circumstances are such crises likely to promote rivalry de-escalation or termination? In an effort to address these questions, I examine an understudied but highly volatile Cold War crisis. Precipitated by an ambitious NATO military exercise, the Able Archer 83 crisis, like the Cuban Missile Crisis 21 years earlier, appears to have pushed the superpowers to the brink of nuclear warfare. Information revealed by Soviet defectors about Moscow’s anxiety and possible nuclear response jarred U.S. President Ronald Reagan, altering his understanding of Soviet threat perceptions and pushing him toward negotiation, arms control, and peacemaking with what he had dubbed the “evil empire.” By revealing information, the Able Archer 83 crisis had a profound impact on a key individual, cracking mirror images and triggering a reevaluation of attitudes and policy orientation toward the Soviets that may have constituted the very first step toward a thaw in Soviet-American relations. The case illustrates how volatile, sudden events can act as catalysts of rapprochement between rivals, helping to address the question of timing of initial moves toward peacemaking.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Abstract

The aim of the paper is to advance the understanding of the interface between organised interests and the legislative work of committees within the European Parliament. Hitherto the frontier of academic research has been the establishment of which categories of organised interests have the greatest committee access. This has stopped short of making a direct link between access and the EP’s legislative output. This paper directly contributes to overcoming this disjuncture. Through ninety-four interviews with actively participating organised interests, a clear picture of their optimal strategies emerged. The next phase was to evaluate the effectiveness of this strategy and thereafter establish the extent to which the optimal approach was reflected in actual behaviour. Here the analysis of committee stage amendments was combined with interview data. The results indicate that interests correctly identify the optimal strategy but the quality of their informational message structured the extent to which they were able to adhere to its prescription. The ‘quality threshold’ is informally applied by a group of influential committee members on behalf of the wider committee.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Traditional descriptions of state behavior (and, in particular, realism) focus on power and national interests as explanatory variables. Constructivists take a different view, looking at how state interests and identity are constructed and communicated. This paper looks at a difficult case for realists – large-scale superpower military failure – and answers the question: How do superpowers explain failure? The paper discusses the cases of two failures: the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. How do leaders of superpowers present a lost war, and, in particular, how do they use television to tell the story? The answer to this question involves understanding why leaders believed they had to explain anything at all, and how they shaped the manner in which the story was told. This, then, directly addresses the literature on constructivism and international relations. What is particularly interesting about these cases is how similar the stories were, despite the differences in political and media systems. The paper covers the time periods associated with the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam (January 20, 1969 until March 29, 1973) and Soviet troops from Afghanistan (between Gorbachev's announcement on February 8, 1988 to February 15, 1989). Extensive use of American archival data and memos, including daily news summaries completed by White House staff member Patrick Buchanan with handwritten comments and orders by President Nixon, give a fascinating picture of the American President's media strategy and rationale. The Soviet case incorporates information obtained from interviews with Soviet leaders and television officials, recent archival data, and content analyses of Soviet television. The paper argues that leadership communication strategies, including how leaders frame the story of withdrawal from a failed war, must be understood by focusing on both domestic political considerations and concerns about international identity and the ability to project power. Policy legitimacy, public opinion, and elite bargaining are certainly important, but do not entirely explain why and how leaders account for failure. For example, leaders must balance domestic considerations with perceived international imperatives; Soviet and American leaders alike believed they had particular responsibilities related to interests and power in the international system.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Out of classroom communication (OCC) in the form of email has increased considerably in the past few years. This study relies on Expectancy Violation Theory to examine the impact of using overly casual email messages with instructors. Study one used an experimental method to determine that message quality (casual vs. formal messages) accounted for between 40% and 60% of the variance explained in affect toward the student, student credibility, and message attitude. Message quality also significantly impacted an instructor’s willingness to comply with a simple request for a face-to-face meeting. Whether the instructor knew the student or not only influenced the affect outcome. Knowing the student accounted for 4.1% of the variance in affect, and female instructors were more willing to comply with requests. Study two further examined these findings using a survey of both instructors and students. Findings suggest that instructors are bothered more by casual email messages. The reasons why theses violations occur can be broken into two factors called the “cyberyouth” and “clueless” factors. The two components of email messages that bother instructors more than students are having no author name in the email message and including shortcuts like R U (are you).