Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: I address the issue of alliances cooperation: the specific puzzle is what determines the level of alliance cooperation. I argue that allies honor their alliance when their alliance relationship is institutionalized to generate military interdependence. In contrast with realist theories, I suggest that the alliance institutionalization, not offense-defense balance or threat, determines alliance cooperation.
To test my argument, I will control the level of threat by generating a selection bias intentionally in a following way. The value of the dependent variable, the level of alliance cooperation, is observed in times of non-peaceful and dangerous contingencies whose level of threat is high. In addition to control the level of threat, the relationship between the level of threat and the level of alliance institutionalization is also explored in order to measure the true effect of it.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This study attempts to test the impact of post war alliances on the duration of peace between two former rivals. After the end of a conflict, the ensuing peace lasts longer when it is fortified with various conflict resolution mechanisms. I propose that formation of peaceful alliances as well as engaging each other in economic treaties is part of this post conflict peace fortification process. Alliances along with preferential trading agreements stabilize peace and reduce the probability of initiating a new conflict. Together these mechanisms have a positive impact on the duration of peace between two states in a post conflict setting. The realist power or threat balancing alliances are becoming extinct post 1989, and are being replaced by conflict management institutions that contain alliance obligations, along with other functions. Conflict management alliances are about managing relations between allies; realist alliances are about working together against an external security threat or working together for common gains. This study suggests that former rivals strengthen/ stabilize peace, or engage each other by forming balancing alliances as well as PTA treaties.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Military alliances are formed with varying degrees of institutionalization. While some alliances involve little initial investment or joint planning, others involve significant peacetime costs in establishing formal structures and engaging in military coordination. Several scholars have addressed the reasons states are willing to pay these governance costs in establishing cooperation (e.g., Lake 1999, Weber 2000, Leeds 2000, Morrow 1994, Smith 1995, 1998, Fearon 1997)– through controlling the risks of opportunism and coordinating policy more extensively, state leaders may be able to achieve higher benefits from cooperation. What has received less systematic empirical attention, however, is the comparative performance of highly institutionalized alliances. Are alliances that represent “deeper” cooperation more reliable than their less institutionalized counterparts? The newly expanded Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset includes detailed information about the institutionalization of alliances formed between 1815 and 1989. Using these data, we evaluate the effects of institutionalization on alliance performance. Surprisingly, we find no evidence that alliances with higher levels of peacetime military coordination or more formal alliances are more reliable when invoked by war, nor are allies that have invested in peacetime military coordination more likely to win the wars they fight. We speculate about directions for future research that might help to explain these surprising results.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Existing work cannot explain why countries form or maintain alliances absent security threats, though we know countries routinely do just these things. I argue countries form alliances to manage the essential problem that they must use finite budget resources to provide domestic security and national security; the guns versus butter dilemma. States sometimes form alliances to “contract out” national security so they can allocate more resources to domestic concerns. Not only should we expect alliances to form and endure absent threats, but we should expect more generally that domestic political and economic demands will influence alliance decisions. I examine my theory on sample of all country dyad-years from 1816-1944 using a probit model.

Publication Type: Proceeding