Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: While a consensus seems to exist on the occurrence of temporal change within the judi-cial appointment process, and recent events and relevant literatures attest to the presence of temporal variance, it remains unclear exactly when and where these critical turning points can be found. This analysis of lower court appointment events presents a simple residual analysis that suggests distinct regimes of activity can be identified. Over the last century of activity, at least three of these regimes emerge. The first runs from the turn of the century through the Truman administration. The second period of consistent activity continues through to the middle of the Carter administration, when the modern process of partisan conflict emerges. The presence of these periodic appointment regimes should have new implications for our understanding of appointment norms such as the influence of senatorial courtesy and our expectations for the ideological propensities of success-fully appointed judges.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, most Supreme Court Justices have been appointed from amongst the ranks of the district courts. The vast majority of these Justices have been considered for lifetime tenure only after serving on the Supreme Court bench temporarily for one year. A committee of nine members, of who three are Supreme Court Justices, conducts the appointment of judges in Israel. As a result, there exists an inherent theoretical risk that the independence of temporarily appointed judges vis-à-vis their tenured colleagues during their one-year appointment may be compromised by their temporary status and desire to achieve tenure. The objective of this paper is to examine whether indeed this desire to achieve tenure affects the decisions rendered by them during their temporary appointment. Since one of the main risks to judicial independence in this case is from within the judiciary, the paper will examine the rate of dissent among temporarily appointed judges before and after they are granted tenure, as an indication regarding their independence. In addition, it will examine opinions rendered by temporarily appointed judges on specific matters before and after being appointed permanently. The study will concentrate on judges appointed over the past decade and will employ different methodologies than those previously used in studies regarding dissent within the Israeli Supreme Court.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In their 1986 book, Organized
Interests and American Democracy, Schlozman and Tierney catalogued the
activities that pressure groups used in their attempts to influence
national public policy. Midway through their inventory, the authors
noted that 53 percent of the groups they surveyed engaged in
“attempting to influence appointments to public office” (150). In the
nearly twenty years since Schlozman and Tierney conducted their study,
the appointment process for federal judges and executive branch
appointees has undergone tremendous change. We know, for example, that
with the failed 1987 nomination of Robert Bork and the successful 1991
appointment of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, organized
interests entrenched themselves as an inexorable force in the Senate
confirmation process. Yet, while scholars’ focus on organized interests
and the consequences of their activity has grown exponentially, as has
separate scholars’ study of the appointment process, there remains much
that is unknown about pressure groups’ participation in the process of
making federal appointments. Using original survey data, we revisit
Schlozman and Tierney’s assessment of organized interests and their
activities in the context of the appointment process for federal
positions. Specifically, we hypothesize that the unique nature of the
federal appointment process (as compared with the legislative process)
offers these organizations incentives to participate in the selection
process but also constrains the strategies and techniques that they are
able to employ.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Presidents use political appointments to subcabinet offices to politicize executive agencies and promote bureaucratic responsiveness. Past theories of the appointment process have portrayed presidents as dominating the process because of senatorial deference. Other works have emphasized opposition senators’ assertive role in delaying nominations. Whether presidents respond to senatorial assertiveness with appeasement by nominating less controversial nominees or with aggressive politicization remains unanswered. This study uses data relating to subcabinet nominees’ partisan loyalty and expertise from nominations made between 1965 and 2000, and concludes that the Senate is assertive with its constitutional power but presidents respond by aggressively politicizing executive agencies with partisan loyalists.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: We empirically examine competing articulations of the
administrative presidency strategy (Nathan 1983). It has been argued,
on the one hand, that the administrative presidency strategy implies
that presidents appoint ideological allies to administrative positions.
Alternatively, economists have recognized that strategic agent
selection (i.e., the selection of non-allies) can, in certain
circumstances, maximize a principal's utility (Vickers 1985). We
present a spatial version of the strategic delegation framework for
executive appointments, and test its predictive capacity against that
of the ally principle. Our data include appointee characteristics and
preference estimates for legislators and presidents from 1932-1982. Our
results suggest that the administrative presidency strategy is
incomplete without an account of strategic delegation.