Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This article analyzes three Hollywood films that center around the policy debate activity: Rocket Science, The Great Debaters, and Thumbsucker. Combining a practical knowledge of debate with critical film theory this article will address the authenticity of the representations of the activity in the three films, what the films teach an audience unaffiliated with the activity, and what the films' outside perspectives have to offer the debate community.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper studies the process of gaining public consent about a security threat, or threat legitimation. Threats require legitimation because they are ‘social facts’ and not objective truths or subjective perceptions. Threat legitimation occurs in the public discourse through rhetoric. Political and social actors deploy rhetorical resources and strategies to construct, reproduce, and change narratives about a threat. Unlike previous rhetorical studies, this paper also argues that the influence and power of rhetoric depends on the media environment. The first section of the paper outlines threat legitimation and the role of rhetoric and the media environment. The second section investigates four cases within two different media environments, radio and television. Through these four cases, the paper demonstrates the importance of rhetorical strategies for threat legitimation in US foreign policy, and how the media environment affects the use of rhetoric.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The European Union's 2004 Constitutional Treaty features a new Early Warning System in which national parliaments will for the first time exercise a review of European legislative proposals. While the role of national parliaments is only advisory, it is still highly significant in that it gives them some influence early in the European legislative process. It will empower them to submit a reasoned opinion if they believe a proposal violates subsidiarity - the principle that decisions should whenever possible be taken at the national level. The Commission must respond to these reasoned opinions with arguments of its own. In effect, the Early Warning System establishes a reasoned exchange between the Commission and national parliaments over whether EU legislation is justified in a particular case. This exchange will be a structured argument over the meaning of subsidiarity. As such, it is an excellent test case concerning the logic of arguing in international relations. In this paper I examine the Early Warning System in detail. I show that it is broadly a continuation of, rather than a break with, existing policy concerning the implementation of the subsidiarity principle as a norm of self-limiting governance in the EU. In particular, the involvement of national parliaments is in keeping with the essentially political nature of the norm. In this way, the choice of the Early Warning System is better than other judicial and/or technocratic solutions which were considered but ultimately rejected by the Convention on the Future of Europe. The only error is that it applies to subsidiarity but not to the principle of proportionality - an oversight which, on closer examination, is illogical. The question is, will this new system work? Success may be defined in narrow and broad terms. It will almost certainly succeed in narrow terms, in that it will result in increased parliamentary (and thereby public) scrutiny of the European legislative system, thus alleviating somewhat the EU's chronic democratic deficit. But to succeed in broad terms, it must cause a substantive change in the EU's legislative output, so that it is more respectful of subsidiarity - that is, less frequent and better targeted; this outcome is far less certain. I propose that the Early Warning System will only be broadly successful if the argument between the Commission and national parliaments is constructive. To borrow Thomas Risse's phrase, it must conform to the logic of arguing in which each side attempts to persuade the other, while at the same time listening and being open to changing its mind. The system will fail if the logic of consequences prevails - that is, if it becomes a contest of voting power rather than ideas.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The European Union's 2004 Constitutional Treaty features a new Early Warning System in which national parliaments will for the first time exercise a review of European legislative proposals. While the role of national parliaments is only advisory, it is still highly significant in that it gives them some influence early in the European legislative process. It will empower them to submit a reasoned opinion if they believe a proposal violates subsidiarity - the principle that decisions should whenever possible be taken at the national level. The Commission must respond to these reasoned opinions with arguments of its own. In effect, the Early Warning System establishes a reasoned exchange between the Commission and national parliaments over whether EU legislation is justified in a particular case. This exchange will be a structured argument over the meaning of subsidiarity. As such, it is an excellent test case concerning the logic of arguing in international relations. In this paper I examine the Early Warning System in detail. I show that it is broadly a continuation of, rather than a break with, existing policy concerning the implementation of the subsidiarity principle as a norm of self-limiting governance in the EU. In particular, the involvement of national parliaments is in keeping with the essentially political nature of the norm. In this way, the choice of the Early Warning System is better than other judicial and/or technocratic solutions which were considered but ultimately rejected by the Convention on the Future of Europe. The only error is that it applies to subsidiarity but not to the principle of proportionality - an oversight which, on closer examination, is illogical. The question is, will this new system work? Success may be defined in narrow and broad terms. It will almost certainly succeed in narrow terms, in that it will result in increased parliamentary (and thereby public) scrutiny of the European legislative system, thus alleviating somewhat the EU's chronic democratic deficit. But to succeed in broad terms, it must cause a substantive change in the EU's legislative output, so that it is more respectful of subsidiarity - that is, less frequent and better targeted; this outcome is far less certain. I propose that the Early Warning System will only be broadly successful if the argument between the Commission and national parliaments is constructive. To borrow Thomas Risse's phrase, it must conform to the logic of arguing in which each side attempts to persuade the other, while at the same time listening and being open to changing its mind. The system will fail if the logic of consequences prevails - that is, if it becomes a contest of voting power rather than ideas.