Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper seeks to explain the gradual re-authoritarianization of Russia under Putin by focusing on demands for authoritarianism by citizens. Under what conditions will citizens willingly (but perhaps unknowingly) cede power to an autocrat?

Publication Type: Paper (prepared oral presentation)
Abstract: Although common knowledge seems to agree that authoritarianism is �bad to the self�, previous studies yielded inconclusive results with respect to the health consequences of authoritarianism. In the present research it is studied whether the impact of dispositional and situational health threats depend on level of authoritarianism. In Study 1 conducted in a sample of 132 adults it was revealed that D-Type personality had less negative consequences on depression with high rather than low levels of authoritarianism. Study 2 conducted in a sample of 109 elderly revealed that the effects of negative stressful life events were curbed by higher levels of authoritarianism. It is concluded that while previous studies have amply shown that authoritarianism has adverse consequences for other people, these negative effects do not seem to be particularly present for the self.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Recently scholars started to study political institutions in authoritarian regimes. Legislatures, for example are considered a bargaining arena for deals with members of the opposition. While this might be a relatively cheap tool in single-party regimes, cooptation is probably more expensive to achieve with several parties in a legislature. What determines the introduction of multiparty elections in authoritarian regimes? I argue that such political reforms are a measure to increase intra-elite competition in order to facilitate upward mobility among the supporters of the ruler. Though political liberalization aims at making it more profitable for new individuals to support the ruler, such a measure potentially has a very costly side effect. The ruler might be unable to control the reform process which then ends his rule with a transition to democracy. I develop a theoretical model of political liberalization which is then also used as empirical model, following Signorino (2003).

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Do elections in authoritarian regimes matter? It is often assumed that they are mere window dressing. Yet it is also possible that these elections have independent effects, which make authoritarian leaders care about the elections, despite their ability to manipulate the results through fraud and repression. One way to discover whether authoritarian elections matter is to examine political business cycles (PBCs) in electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes. This study shows that PBCs occur cross-nationally in authoritarian regimes that hold regular elections, but only when the incumbent faces a challenger. In fact, government consumption increases by .43% in election years in competitive elections. Although this number is small, elections have the largest impact on government spending of the variables included in the model. Also, evidence from case studies portray PBCs in authoritarian regimes as targeted and informal. Therefore, in the case of informal spending, much pre-electoral spending may not be captured by overall government consumption or, in the case of targeted spending, the magnitude of the increase for certain groups will similarly not be captured by this aggregate variable. From the evidence presented in this study, we can conclude that PBCs occur in competitive authoritarian settings, indicating that dictators care about electoral returns.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: My theoretical argument is inspired by main arguments that Boix (2003) makes in Democracy and Redistribution. Boix’ argument is that the challenge to the ruling elites comes from the lower classes, who wish to change the re-distributional equilibrium in the society (p. 171). He perceives three possible re-distributional outcomes: 1) Right-wing authoritarian regimes, in which practically no transfers take place (also, limited taxes); 2) Democracies, which have more redistribution of wealth, based on the aspirations of the median voter; 3) Revolutionary regimes, which are prone to the follies of nationalization and central planning, eventually leading to corruption and economic stagnation (p. 3). Asset specificity plays into the hands of the “revolutionary” regimes such as those we usually see in Russia, because oligarchs like Khodorkovsky, Abramovich and may others cannot move them out of the country, they are immobile. That’s why they are very vulnerable targets for re-distribution either by democratic regimes through taxation, or authoritarian regimes through expropriation (which is the case in Russia). The latter helps to strengthen the hands of the authoritarian regime in Russia, which acts recklessly domestically and int-ly.