Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Pattern-avoiding of self-avoiding walks
Shanzhen Gao, Shaun Sullivan, Heinrich Niederhausen

A self-avoiding walk (SAW) is a sequence of moves on a lattice which does not visit the same point more than once. It was given as one of the two classical combinatorial problems in the Encylopaedia Britannica. A SAW is interesting for simulations because its properties cannot be calculated analytically. Calculating the number of self-avoiding walks in any given lattice is a common computational problem. We will present some interesting problems on pattern-avoiding of self-avoiding walks and show you how to solve a few of them.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Sixteen press releases from Enron and 16 releases from WorldCom representing the first three months of each organization’s financial crises were gathered from the organization’s web sites. The goal of this study was to determine whether the dominant public communication tactic of these companies was to avow or promote frankness, a traditional public relations stance, or to avoid or be evasive, a traditional legal stance. The releases were compared to 47 published accounts of the unfolding financial crises to determine whether the organizational messages remained intact. The findings show no dominant communication strategy in either company. Both professed openness but engaged in blame shifting. The combined message strategy suggests cooperation between legal and public relations counsel. The messages of both organizations were successfully transmitted via the mass media but were tempered by solid reporting. These findings suggest additional evidence that legal and public relations crisis communication strategies are starting to blur.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Let $\$H\$$ be a subgraph of a graph $\$G\$$. If there is a hamiltonian cycle $\$C\$$ in $\$G\$$ such that $\$E(C)\backslash cap\; E(H)=\backslash emptyset\$$ then we will call $\$C\$$ an $\{\backslash it\; \$H\$-avoiding\; hamiltonian\; cycle\}$ and say that $\$G\$$ is $\{\backslash it\; \$H\$-avoiding\; hamiltonian\}$. In this talk, we will give minimum degree and degree-sum conditions, based on $\$H\$$, that imply a graph is $\$H\$$-avoiding hamiltonian. In particular, we will consider the cases where $\$H\$$ is a family of edge-disjoint hamiltonian cycles or a family of edge-disjoint perfect matchings. In either case, an $\$H\$$-avoiding hamiltonian cycle serves to extend these families.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Are omnibus appropriations bills simply the result of a distracted, gridlocked, or even lazy legislative branch or do they serve a very specific purpose in congressional electoral strategies? In the course of this paper I examine the opportunities that appropriations bills provide for members of Congress to both claim credit and avoid blame, in the vein of Mayhew and Arnold. To do this the appropriations bills from the 99th through the 108th Congresses are examined for factors contributing to their inclusion in any omnibus appropriation that was constructed for that fiscal year. Broader electoral year effects and more specific electoral concerns of individual members will be analyzed in the context of the fluctuations of the appropriations’ bottom lines from session to session as possible activators for credit-claiming and blame-avoidance. What percentage of appropriations growth would encourage members to vote for the bill as a stand-alone appropriation? Conversely, what level of cuts to an appropriation bill would promote inclusion of the bill in an annual omnibus bill? At what point do electoral concerns activate an overarching risk-aversion that causes bills to be included in the omnibus regardless of expansion or contraction of funds?

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This study probes the underlying assumptions of strategic conflict avoidance in response to the incentives for diversionary uses of force to address whether states respond strategically to the threat that the U.S. might intervene against them during an international crisis when the incentives for U.S. leaders to employ diversionary uses of force are high. Examining crisis behavior during international crises, this study tests the influences of U.S. domestic conditions on crisis selection and escalation for potential target states. The findings reveal only mixed support for strategic selection by states responding to declining U.S. domestic conditions that increase the likelihood of U.S. leaders entering an international crisis as a third party to employ diversionary force abroad.