Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The Baltic security triangle represents a unique unit of analysis in international politics. It can be examined as an example of Karl Deutsch’s Political Security Community (1957). Put into operation, the Baltic Triangle can explain the components of a modern developing security community where a group of states have become integrated and the units in the group have a dependable expectation of peaceful relations within the region. The Baltic Triangle can also serve as an example of a “zone of peace,” where there is no conflict within the region. The security concerns of each member of the region are interrelated and thus represent a forum for collective action in the international security front. This article will demonstrate the usefulness of the theoretical concepts of a security community and a zone of peace in modern interstate relations. It will then further develop these concepts as they apply to the Baltic region. The principles of a security community and zones of peace will lay the theoretical foundations for future work on security relations in the region and suggest how regions can play an important role in the understanding of peace and progress in the post-Cold War world.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The purpose of this piece is twofold, first, to explore the social construction of a Nordic-Baltic sphere of community, and, secondly, to evaluate its conceptual implications for IR debates on new and more inclusive forms of political community. The paper commences by exploring the social incubation of the Nordic-Baltic sphere of community, in particular by examining the values, norms and specific accounts of interest that underpin it. In doing so it explores to what extent the Nordic states have been successful in adopting a new and more all-encompassing form of ?collective identity? and whether they have been willing to re-conceptualise their sense of obligation and identity to include the three Baltic states. A key argument developed throughout the paper is that the creation of such new forms of political community require agents to adjust their distinctive national loyalties because they may obstruct efforts to pursue new forms of solidarity and collective identity. This conception of community differs from that of pure communitarians who hold that moral agents are situated selves and that their sense of morality and solidarity is confined to their co-nationals. Rather it rests upon Linklater?s (1998) advocacy of new forms of political community that respect national loyalties while also supporting social and cultural diversity and whereby ethical principles and issues of justice can be negotiated through equal political dialogue. Emphasis upon equal partnership has been an influential feature in Nordic-Baltic relations since the onset. Community building of this kind is in line with wider developments in post-Cold War Europe, where emphasis has been given to the creation of new and more inclusive spheres of community. A key objective here is to show how the Nordic-Baltic sphere of community can contribute to this theoretical debate by making a normative case for the construction of new and more inclusive forms of political community in Europe and elsewhere, embracing both policy elites and civil society (Linklater, 1998). In order to substantiate these claims the paper explores the Nordic states? post-Cold War support for the Baltic states? re-entry into the international community. The paper concludes by arguing that although the Nordic states have made numerous efforts to extend their sense of obligation and identity to the three Baltic states they display the same inclination as any other modern states to provide for their own citizens before seeing to the needs of others. Thus they adhere to the principle that the ?primary duty? of states is ?to pursue the interests of their peoples but in the context of a set of wider duties towards other states, and through other states, the rest of humanity? (Brown 2001:26). In so doing they embrace a thin cosmopolitanism which entails being exceptionally mindful of the needs of other states while privileging the welfare needs of their own citizens. More importantly, such thin cosmopolitanism is consistent with Linklater?s (1998) advocacy of new forms of political community that respect national loyalties while arguing for obligation across borders.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This research will focus on the Königsberg region in the context of the enlargement of NATO and the EU. Several dimensions of security, from military security right through to "soft" security issues, present and future threats, such as weapons trafficking and organised crime, will be analysed. It will consider ways in which the problems can be exported to the surrounding countries and to Europe as a whole.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Despite significant efforts to improve environmental safety in Baltic Sea oil transportation, the risk of a major accident with devastating oil spills has most likely increased. In this article, it is argued that unilateral and sub-regional initiatives ma

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Over the last few years there has been much debate about the future geopolitical construction of Europe and the nature of the evolving relationship between Europe and the US. The focus in these debates has largely been on the positions of the major powers, with the voices of smaller and less obviously powerful states in Europe largely sidelined. In this framework small states are often depicted as 'marginal', where marginality is understood in terms of a lack of power and limited subjectivity. Marginality is equated with a position of being either on, near, at or beyond the edge. With power understood as residing at the centres (big states/great powers) of the international system, states in the margins have been viewed as largely uninteresting to disciplines like International Relations.In more recent years there have been attempts to challenge this dominant view. Margins are also sites of action and should not be discounted as easily as they usually are. Similarly, adopting a discursive approach demonstrates how 'margins' can possess power by trying to frame the nature of borders between centres and therefore also the character of their salient environment. This paper adopts a slightly different perspective. Focusing on the small states of the East Baltic (Estonia, Finland and Latvia) the paper starts from the premise that marginality is not only about one's 'position' in relation to different power centres, but is also about 'identity'. In this context, the paper seeks to show how conceptions of marginality have become embedded since the nineteenth century as a central aspect of the identities of these states. Developing the concept of 'mindscapes of marginality' we demonstrate how differing narratives of marginality have come to play important roles in national identity construction and foreign policy orientation in each of these states. This requires showing how marginality has been linked to various other concepts like the North/Nordic, Baltic, East, West, Europe, 'Europe between', neutrality, frontier, border and pioneer spirit.Beyond this, however, we argue that whether marginality has been viewed positively or negatively, what marginality is understood to relate to is changing. Historically marginality predominantly has been perceived in either cultural terms (in terms of easternness or northernnerness and especially during the nineteenth century) or in geopolitical terms. In this respect, for the small states of the East Baltic marginality has been about their relationship to and between the power centres of the European balance of power. Russia has been particularly salient in this respect, but Germany and 'the West' have also played important roles. Today, however, marginality appears to be in the process of being detached from conceptions of geopolitics and culture, and in these countries at least, is increasingly narrated in terms of globalisation. This shift in the relationship to 'marginality' in their national identity narratives is arguably framing their approaches to foreign policy in ways radically different to previous foreign policy orientations. Moreover, this frame also contrasts markedly with the 'return to geopolitics' evident in the discourses of the great powers concerning the future construction of Europe.