Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Academic literature analyzing the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land-use subgovernment stops at the Taylor Grazing Act and concludes that the historical development of administering grazing on public lands led to the capture of the BLM by ranching interests. Using a two-pronged methodological approach of process tracing and elite interviews this dissertation seeks to advance our collective knowledge of subgovernment theory by a) clarifying the impact executive decision-making has on subgovernments and b) identifying the conditions under which strategically competitive behavior between two competing subgovernment actors occurs. The dissertation seeks to update the literature by explaining what has caused the BLM to shift from a rancher-dominated agency to an energy dominated agency by identifying conditions under which subgovernment actors strategically responded to a political conflict.

The research poses two questions: 1) how have executive actions disrupted an existing balance of power in a so-called “strong corner” of an entrenched subgovernment system, and 2) what happens when conflict and competition break out between allied members of the system? Analysis indicates that as the BLM responded to Executive actions emphasizing domestic energy production, a conflict emerged between traditional allies: ranching and energy.

Triggered by the unintended consequence of awakening long-dormant legislation, split-estate energy development—where property rights are severed between private surface and federal mineral estates—expanded across the West. In turn, this expansion helped establish the conditions for conflict and in doing so disrupted the balance of power between large public resource use interests in the relatively stable land-use subgovernment of the BLM.

Indicative of energy’s emerging dominance of the BLM’s subgovernment, split-estate energy development led ranching interests to seek the protection of their Western state legislatures. This shift in domination led to a series of fiercely competitive political responses between the formerly allied interest groups.

Findings indicate that as the political conflict intensified it became clear that the BLM’s land-use policies were no longer dominated by ranching interests, but were now dominated by energy development interests. The analysis concludes that this shift in domination disproves the long accepted conclusion that the BLM is forever an agency captured by ranching interests and that subgovernments are beyond the control of the President.