Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: As the first nuclear century drew to a close, international relations scholars have paid increasing attention to the phenomenon of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear reversal. Intuitively, the decision by states to relinquish the awesome power of nuclear weapons may appear puzzling as these arms traditionally have been thought to provide military might, political prestige and security. However, by the end of the 20th century, several states had opted for a voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons in search of other national security alternatives. Three states in particular – Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan - offer a unique opportunity to study instances of nuclear reversal. A comparative analysis of the nuclear policies of the three post-Soviet states offers a possibility to theorize about the potential causal mechanisms that can lead to denuclearization. Although the ultimate outcome in each one of these three cases was the same – attainment of a nuclear-free status – the paths taken by each country varied substantially. The comparative examination of the different denuclearization paths will yield insights into the underlying causes of each state’s nuclear actions that, in turn, will illuminate some general implications of this recent experience for other nuclear fence sitters in different parts of the world.
Arguing against the conventional explanations of nuclear behavior propagated by neorealist as well as normative perspectives, the paper will introduce an explanatory model of nuclear reversal by non-great powers based upon the logic of “prudent realism”. Specifically, the model will test two related hypotheses with respect to states’ decision about renunciation of nuclear weapons. In combination, these two hypotheses constitute the causal mechanism of the nuclear reversal process. First, it will be suggested that nuclear decisions have something to do with the nature of a state’s relation with a regional hegemon. Second, it will be hypothesized that nuclear reversal hinges upon the considerations of short-term economic cost/benefit analysis as well as long-term economic prosperity considerations. The proposed model will incorporate international and domestic level analysis in order to uncover the specifics of the causal mechanism leading to a decision about nuclear reversal. These hypotheses will be tested on the three post-Soviet cases. To illustrate the generalizability of the model beyond the former Soviet region, the model will be tested on the case of South Africa in the early 1990s.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Terrorism, and Suicide bombing in particular, has demonstrated a "contagion effect." We can discern the direct (patron-client) and indirect (through observation) influences of suicide terror. In some instances, insurgent factions have been physically trained by other organizations and taught how to best use horrifying tactics to devastating effect, who subsequently import the tactic far and wide. Terrorist groups provide financing, technical, and tactical training. On other occasions, factions observe the successful operations of groups from afar -- because of the publicity and media attention engendered by spectacular bombings, and then imitated the techniques to suit local circumstances. This paper investigates the process of contagion and demonstrates how terrorist organizations "learn" from each other.

Publication Type: Proceeding

Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: In the world today there is a large gap between the number of states that could easily obtain the military power of nuclear weapons and the number of states that actually choose that power. Curiously, a number of states that sought that power at one time or another have abandoned it. Yet, in other states, the quest for nuclear weapons continues. What causes this variance in behavior?
Scholars generally rely on one of three explanatory models to address this question. The security model argues that states develop nuclear weapons when they find them useful to bolster their own security and deter external threats. The domestic model finds that states develop nuclear weapons if it strengthens the regime internally to do so. Finally, the normative model suggests that a desire to reinforce positive aspects of a states identity will lead it to pursue nuclear develop or adhere to a prohibition against nuclear weapons.
This paper evaluates the relative weight of these three explanatory models in the decision-making process of three very early nuclear-capable states. This paper codes the justifications made by political leaders in Great Britain, Canada, and Australia in the 1950s and 1960s. The purpose of this analysis is to determine the relative weight of three distinct and competing explanations for nuclear acquisition, and to suggest a means of evaluating additional cases nuclear and potential nuclear states.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: By recounting the story of the recent operational restructuring of the National Weather Service (NWS), this paper represents a first attempt to gain insight into the sociocultural assumptions embodied in the construction of technological systems. Specifically, I trace the effort of the NWS to carve a niche for itself as a high quality data provider in order to remain viable and relevant through the engineering of an elaborate sociotechnical complex, meant to secure the cooperation of all necessary actors (forecasters, machines, the weather, and NWS customers). My ethnographic research at a local NWS forecasting office provides the necessary vantage point whence to explore the impact of this sociotechnical innovation on operational forecasters and highlights their experiences as they struggle to adapt to weather forecasting in the digital age.