Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper explains and evaluates a teaching strategy designed to strengthen student awareness of international news and international perceptions of the United States. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, students in my introductory American government course were required to monitor news coverage of the crisis in English-language newspapers published outside the United States. Students wrote reports and gave class presentations that compared political news coverage and analysis in more than 20 countries and related the global ramifications of September 11th with the content of the survey course. The activity has shed light upon both the promise and the challenges of using the Internet as a teaching tool as well as using news coverage from overseas as a lens through which to explore the American political tradition.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Although the movement for women’s voting rights in the United States has received attention from scholars across a number of disciplines, relatively few studies have focused on explaining outcomes, particularly at the state level. Much of the scholarship focuses on explaining movement activism, while the little existing work on outcomes has mostly only borrowed social movement frameworks that do not explicitly account for politicians’ incentives.In this paper I offer a theoretical framework for understanding the politics of suffrage adoption, one that focuses on the incentives of partisan politicians, and detail how the framework applies to the case of woman suffrage. Building in an account of legislative decision-making on the issue of suffrage extension reveals the ways in which suffrage coalitions, particularly alliances with third parties, structured the chances for adoption of woman suffrage in the American states.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The ability to raise large sums of money is essential for non-incumbent candidates who hope to field strong campaigns for office. As a result, changes in campaign finance laws have important ramifications for competition in U.S. House elections. The 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BiCRA) increased the limits on individual contributions to U.S. House candidates from $1000 to $2000 per election, but little is known about how this change might affect fundraising practices among different types of candidates. We use data from election cycles from 1992 to 2000 to explore how candidate characteristics, competitive context and national tides influence the ability of non-incumbent candidates to secure large contributions. We find that, independent of other factors, experienced challengers are more effective at raising large
contributions, but the type of prior experience matters. Previous office-holders who have held statewide or federal office, and those who have served in highly professional legislatures are most able to raise funds from large donors. A preliminary look at the first election cycle after BiCRA supports the extrapolation of our findings to the new fundraising context and suggests that the implementation of BiCRA will benefit some types of candidates more than others.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper aims to explain cross-national variation of competitive price level measured by purchasing power parity (PPP). Prices can be an important indicator of national competitiveness in the sense that they signal both cost pressure and profit potential to producers and inform purchasing power of disposable income for consumer. It is Rogowski and Kayser who initiate a political explanation of prices (2002). They contend that majoritarian systems lower prices more than proportional system. This paper elaborates their contention by examining an intervening variable that has received insufficient attention in previous studies on the relationship between electoral systems and prices: corporate governance. Corporate governance is understood as a bundle of rules and institutions regulating two factor markets for production: the financial capital market and labor market. This paper sets up two-stage sequential game of price determination and carries statistical tests.

Publication Type: Proceeding