Showing 1 through 5 of 129 records. | | Pages: 1 pages | || | Words: 152 words | || | |
| 1. Cho, Hye Jee. "Do IMF Programs Discipline Budget Deficit?: The Effects of IMF Programs on Government Budget Balance, Expenditure, and Revenue" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar 05, 2005 <Not Available>. 2009-12-03 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p70649_index.html>Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper aims to explain the effects of IMF programs on central government's budget balance, expenditure, and revenue. Previous works in the literature largely ignored the mechanisms by which IMF programs have effects, and this paper contributes to the literature by looking at the micro-level policy impacts of the IMF through conditionality. There have been only a few studies that address the question of IMF programs' effects on budget balance, and they suffer from inaccurate measures of budget balance and do not control for the selection bias that is commonly associated with the studies of program participation. This paper employs improved measures of budget balance and methods that correct for selection bias. Using the data of ninety-three developing countries from 1951 to 2000, this paper shall argue that IMF programs are effective in reducing government expenditure but fail to increase revenue. Therefore, the IMF program participation does not influence overall budget deficits. |
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| 3. Bernick, Lee. and Gatti, Josephine. "Not all Budget Information is Equal: Explaining Budget Transparency in County Governments" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL, <Not Available>. 2009-12-03 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p268976_index.html>Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: A sample of county governments are used to evaluate budget and fiscal information provided to the public. An index of Budget Transparency was created using key budgeting concepts. Variation in transparency is explained by state and local factors. |
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| | Pages: 23 pages | || | Words: 11729 words | || | |
| 4. Rudalevige, Andrew. "Budgeting for a New Imperial Presidency?: The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act At Thirty" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 15, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-12-03 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p83211_index.html>Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The passage of the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (CBICA) was supposed to enhance both legislative responsibility and fiscal prudence, wresting back “the power of the purse” from the executive branch. But after decades of deficit politics, late or non-existent budgets, and the re-emergence of impoundments – this time, Congressionally-sanctioned, through the Line-Item Veto Act – the outgoing head of the Congressional Budget Office opined that “the Congressional budget process is dead.” This paper explores that claim: thirty years later, has this aspect of post-Watergate resurgence crumbled like so much of its relatives in the resurgence regime? If so, why? I suggest that future study of this topic could gain leverage by systematizing game theoretic frameworks grounded in the conditions underlying the blame avoidance and credit claiming choices of legislators. |
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| | Pages: 38 pages | || | Words: 13355 words | || | |
| 5. Dickinson, Matthew. and Rudalevige, Andrew. "Institutionalizing Responsiveness: Roosevelt, Nixon, and the Evolution of the Office of Management and Budget" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2009-12-03 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209813_index.html>Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: ABSTRACT: Scholars are engaged in a long-running dispute regarding the merits of “politicizing” the Office of Management and Budget (formerly the Bureau of the Budget). In this debate, Franklin Roosevelt’s BoB and Richard Nixon’s OMB are often characterized as exhibiting “neutral” and “responsive” competence, respectively. Despite these organizational differences, however, we suggest that the administrative strategies utilized by FDR and Nixon vis a vis the BoB/OMB are driven by similar motives: both presidents sought to make the budget agency more responsive to their leadership needs. However, because they presided in different political and policy contexts, their administrative strategies took distinctly different forms. Our analysis suggests that the meaning of responsiveness varies over time and political context. |
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