Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The procedural system of Islamic Criminal Law has been, either constructively or destructively, mounted with criticisms. One of the reasons for these criticisms is assumingly based on lack of incorporating the objective of Islamic Law through ‘intertexualizing’ the textual evidences on one hand and failure to extrapolate all sources available for ‘dynamizing’ the Shariah legal system.

In Islamic criminal system, certainty of the criminal intent and action “mens rea and actus reus” carries vital roles in adjudication and thus, for delivering justice especially in cases that involve harsh punishment such as huduud and qisaas} (fixed and retaliative punishments)

“Islamic legal maxims” is one of the sources which aphoristically subsumes all the spectrums that purpose of Shariah is all about. There are five basic Islamic legal maxims on which the tenet of Islamic law is based. Among others is the maxim “al yaqiin laa yazuul bi al-shakk” (certainty cannot be repelled by doubt.).

This article is aimed to address how this legal maxim and its sisters can be explored to ensure justices in Islamic criminal procedure. In doing so, the maxim and related ones will be explained. To make it more empirical some criminal cases published or judged in some Islamic countries will be evaluated.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The silvery minnow, a native to the Rio Grande is fighting for its life. It current habitat is just a mere 5% of a range that once stretched from Espanola in northern New Mexico to the Gulf of Mexico. It has been listed as an endangered species since 1994. However, efforts to ensure the long term survival of this species have been limited. This stems from the weak application of the Endangered Species Act as well as from myopic solutions offered by the city of Albuquerque to create special fisheries to preserve the silvery minnow. In March 2003, the Fish and Wildlife Service designated 157 miles as a critical habitat for the minnow. However this is only a partial solution. Without the development of a stringent state-wide water conservation plan, the minnow’s respite from extinction will be short lived. In many areas, due to diversion, over-consumption and mismanagement, the once mighty Rio Grande has been reduced in many areas to merely a stream. If definitive measures are not taken to save the silvery minnow, the entire Rio Grande Ecosystem could be at risk.

Several policy solutions need to be adopted. First the Fish and Wildlife Service needs to apply the Endangered Species Act to its fullest extent. The designated critical habitat may allow the minnow to survive, but is inadequate to ensure its recovery. Therefore multiple critical habitat locations need to be established. Additionally, the city of Albuquerque which is a third the size of Phoenix yet consumes more water must develop water conservation methods similar to those practiced in California (i.e. low flush toilets and temperature mechanized sprinkler systems). The long term survival of the silvery minnow as well as the entire Rio Grande ecosystem will only be guaranteed if there is full implementation of the Endangered Species Act as well as adherence to strategic conservation.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Examining the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, this paper shows that moral sense or sentiment alone cannot identify moral truth. The paper first introduces the theories and examines the main differences between them. It then examines whether moral judgment based on moral sense or sentiment varies according to one's religious or philosophical belief. The following becomes clear. In all three theories, false religious beliefs can pervert one's moral judgment. In Hutcheson's theory, answers to such cases as stem cell research, abortion, and active euthanasia do not change according to spectator's religious or philosophical belief. But, an answer to active euthanasia can change according to agent's religious or philosophical belief. Hume's theory cannot provide answers to such cases as stem cell research, abortion, and active euthanasia where a patient is unconscious. It can sometimes provide an answer to active euthanasia where a patient is conscious. Yet, the answer can vary depending on patient's and spectator's religious or philosophical beliefs. Unlike Hume's theory, Smith's theory can provide answers to all those cases. But, the answers can vary depending on agent's religious or philosophical belief. Most of these show that moral sense or sentiment alone cannot identify moral truth.

On the whole, Hume's and Smith's theories are just the descriptions of human nature. This means they do not answer the question of how we ought to live. Even if they have some normative implications, they draw normative claims from human nature. The paper argues that one cannot always draw norms from human nature by examining the sentiments of anger, vengeance, superiority, and sympathy. To support this, the paper points out the moral sense and sentiment in Hume's or Smith's sense can change throughout times. The criticism that one cannot always draw norms from human nature does not apply to Hutcheson's theory because he bases morality not on human nature as it is but on disinterested benevolence. Yet, the paper argues that disinterested benevolence is not enough for morality, and there are no sentiments the presence of which alone makes an action or rule moral.

Moral relativists argue that moral sense or sentiment varies across people, societies, cultures, or times, and there is no moral sense or sentiment which people universally agree on. The paper presents three defenses of sentimentalism and examines them. The first defense is that Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, and James Wilson suggest there is universal moral sense or sentiment. The paper argues that even if it exists, some external standard is necessary to identify it. The second and third defenses are to adopt a general viewpoint theory and an ideal observer theory, both of which give objectivity and universality to moral judgment based on moral sense or sentiment. The paper points out the general viewpoint theory needs to employ reason, and even if not, it does not guarantee us to identify moral truth. The ideal observer theory still does not show that moral sense or sentiment alone can identify moral truth.

Publication Type: Poster
Abstract: Who says that clergywomen have no sense of humor? Transcripts of 38 clergywomen were analyzed for the use of humor when recalling difficult situations. Although much research indicates an inverse relationship between spirituality and humor usage in non-humorous situations, the women in this study appear to challenge this notion.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Insights from Disruptive Innovation theory (DI) are often used in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of national security policy. DI explains why successful companies are sometimes defeated by new competitors with relatively unsophisticated products. Although DI is highly influential in the business literature, its applicability to military doctrine has not been persuasively shown. A more abstract and general version of DI is proposed here which improves its foundations, adapts it to militaries, and suggests a framework for the reliable identification of disruptive innovations. This new theory is tested by examining the Royal Navy before and during World War I and evaluating how well it explains the Royal Navy’s success at developing ASW to protect the battlefleet from submarine attacks and its near-failure at implementing convoy tactics to protect merchant shipping. This generalized version of DI successfully explains several key features of the case.