Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In a seminal article, Cox (1990) suggested that electoral systems with larger district magnitude provide incentives for parties to advocate more extreme policy positions. In this article we put this proposition to the test. Informed by recent advances in spatial models of party competition (Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005), we introduce a design that simultaneously estimates the equilibrium location of parties, as the weight voters attach to the expected distribution of seats and votes changes. The utility that voters assign—that is, the psychological effect—relative to the expected seats received by parties—the mechanical effect—yields clear predictions about the expected equilibrium location of parties. Under majoritarian electoral rules, large parties increase their vote share and their equilibrium location becomes more moderate. By contrast, smaller parties see their vote share decline and are pushed toward more extreme equilibrium positions. Survey data from five parliamentary democracies provide evidence of centripetal effects for large parties, and centrifugal effects for small ones, under different electoral rules and levels of party competition.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In the electoral systems literature, debates about the relative merits of PR versus majoritarian electoral arrangements are commonplace. One of the arguments most commonly advanced in support of majoritarianism is that majoritarian institutions have a “centripetal” effect on elites and voters by forcing them to build bridges and form coalitions across multiple sub-national categories of identity. Do the rules that structure political competition select for certain types of actors or, perhaps, exert a measurable influence on the on how competitive actors identify themselves? I use a hierarchical modeling strategy to test the implications of this general theory for individuals. I hypothesize that, under majoritarian systems, individuals who are political activists (i.e. highly partisan and active in politics) will be more likely to identify strongly with a sub-national ethnic group than individuals who are less politically engaged. Data from individuals surveyed in ten African states show confirm this hypothesis, suggesting that the electoral “rules of the game” matter not only for state-level outcomes (like civil war incidence, satisfaction with democracy, etc.) but also for the individuals who compete under them.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In this paper we seek to explain IGR in Britain (with a focus on Scotland) and Belgium, and, respecting the general theme linking the papers of this panel, we also wish to consider the extent to which intergovernmental interactions in both countries have assumed a �non-hierarchical� character. We define IGR as patterns of centralregional (vertical) or inter-regional (horizontal) interaction between different (levels of) government(s) within a state with a view of co-ordinating issues of mutual concern.i Furthermore, our paper analyses policy-coordination in three different settings: a devolved setting (Britain), a constitutionally federalized setting (Belgium) and a three-tiered EU setting (insofar as we also consider to what extent these regions interact with the European Union). We hypothesize that devolution or federalism as well as the interaction of either setting with the EU influences the nature of IGR and the capacity of the centre to engage in hierarchical policy co-ordination.