Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Media plays a crucial role in advertising a party’s and its candidates’ issue positions and getting the name out. Also, media coverage of debates and confrontations between parties and party leaders in and outside of the legislative arena, as well as of campaigns, is integral to set the tone and agenda of an election. That mass media influences people’s way of thinking and evaluation of politics in a ‘not-so-minimal’ way has been argued by many scholars. In a classic rendition of this argument, the more coverage time and space the media allocates to a certain issue, the saliency of the issue tends to increase.

Following the foregoing argument, this paper demonstrates that as the media puts more emphasis on a potential source of division among voters, it will increase voter awareness of the cleavage, presumably setting the agenda of the election for the voters. The paper amasses articles from four major newspapers of South Korea from 1965 to 2005 to show that there is an apparent match between media coverage of the cleavage-i.e., region- and electoral returns. Also, a content analysis of these articles illustrates that the language used and value judgment made or represented by the media regarding regional division in the country affects each political party in a different way. It is noteworthy that there is a positive and fairly strong correlation between the amount of media coverage of regional cleavage and regional concentration of the vote in an election, which provides a sound case of often-debated media effects.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The rise of the radical right is open to multiple interpretations. The question addressed in this paper is whether many of these parties have fostered an enduring social base among core voters and, if so, which social sectors are most likely to support them. Part I discusses the alternative theoretical frameworks provided by the classic accounts of the 1950s and 1960s, the ‘new social cleavage’ thesis common during the last decade, and the theory of partisan dealignment. The chapter then compares evidence to analyze rival hypotheses about the social basis of the radical right vote across fifteen nations, using data drawn from the European Social Survey, 2002 and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2001. Part II focuses upon the role of socioeconomic indicators, while Part III considers the enduring gender gap and patterns of generational support. The conclusion considers the implications of these results for understanding the basis of radical right popularity, and for the stability and longevity of these parties.

This paper is drawn from Chapter 6 of Radical Right: Parties and Electoral Competition, a new book by the author forthcoming with Cambridge University Press (2005).

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper, based on a long term observation of the period from 1996 to 2004, tries to answer the following questions: Why have some issues evolved to be important political cleavages which shaping party competition in Taiwan, while some other issues have not? Why have some issues affected elections at some times, but not others? And finally, has there been any change in issue evolution because of the party turnover in 2000?

Unlike most industrial democracies where issues of economy and wealth distribution are salient for party competition, issues of economy and wealth distribution are relatively not so salient for party competition in Taiwan. Some argue that this is so because the Taiwanese government’s economic policies had successfully resolved the problems of wealth accumulation and distribution over the decades as economic development heated up. However, the Taiwanese electorate has not punished the ruling party even though the wealth distribution has deteriorated and the economy has declined dramatically since the beginning of 2000. Taiwanese have not chosen the party which is generally thought of as good at handling the economy affairs. This shows that most Taiwanese voters seldom vote according to the economy and welfare distribution even though many parties and candidates do emphasize economy and social welfare policies in their campaign platforms. In contrast, the independence/unification issue shaped by ethnicity and national identity has been considered as the most salient issue since the 1990s. Not only has it dominated political discussions of political elites and the public, but it also has shaped party competition and affected the transfer of political power. This paper tries to explore the reasons for these phenomena through two angles: that of elites, and of the public.

This paper examines four issues, reform/stability, independence/unification, social welfare, and environment/economy, and shows how partisan elites frame and develop these issues to attain their political goals, and how Taiwanese voters respond. Research findings show that the independence/unification issue is the most likely to evolve into the most influential issue in Taiwanese politics. This is so because all major parties have a clear and distinct position on the independence/unification issues, and most Taiwanese voters have a clear-cut position on the issue. Furthermore, Taiwanese voters make political decisions based on the issue. After the party turnover in 2000, the parties’ positions on the dependence/unification issue became even more polarized. The Pan-green’s position on the dimension is moving toward an even more pro-independence stance. In the meantime, the Pan-blue’s position is becoming even more pro-unification. The growing polarization between the two blocs has made the independence/unification issue even more salient and has had decisive impacts on Taiwanese voters’ political attitudes and behavior.

In contrast, because the diversities among parties in other three issues are getting closer since the party turnover, it is more difficult for a party to take all credits from the issues. In the near future, it is quite possible that all parties will still focus most of their efforts on framing and developing positions on the independence/unification issue rather than on other issue dimensions.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The goal of this paper is to draw a parallel between the rise of Marxism as a militant, anti-Western ideology in the first half of the 20th century and the present state of North-South relations with an emphasis on Islamic fundamentalism. Three historical events will be used as examples for the possible course of anti-Western actions in the South and their consequences for the West.During the first half of the 20th century Marxism was the most aggressive anti-Western ideology. Promoted by both internal and external forces, it tried to destroy not only the capitalist and democratic internal structure of Western countries but also their world hegemony. Despite obvious differences, we witness today the emergence of a similar challenge: the rise of global, if still unarticulated anti-Western movements, out of which Islamic fundamentalism seems to be the most active. It is true that, unlike Marxism, they are less capable of contaminating the West itself. Bu the reactions they can generate within the West and among West?s allies are no less dangerous.I will start with the analysis of three interesting cases of Marxist rebellions. All took place aboard navies of Western or Western-oriented states cruising the Black Sea or the Eastern Mediterranean. All were parts of wider Marxist movements. And all failed. Nevertheless, I consider their study most helpful for the present evolution of North-South (or, rather, West-South) divide.The three examples are the 1905 rebellion of the Potemkine battleship crew, immortalized by the famous Eisenstein movie; the Black Sea rebellion of the French navy servicemen sent to support the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Russian Civil War; and the rebellion of Greek seamen whose ships had taken refuge in British-controlled Alexandria during the Nazi occupation of Greece.Of course, I do not suggest American forces in Iraq or Afghanistan will follow the example of French crews and rebel in sympathy of Islamic fundamentalism. Nevertheless, the three examples might be echoed by evolutions different in details but similar in essence. Despite the uprising of her seamen, France did not become Marxist in 1919. But Russia and Greece did have Marxist civil wars were announced if not ignited by their respective rebellions. Some of today expeditionary forces in Middle East are very similar to navies cruising Levantine seas a century ago. They might ignite the same kind of political unrest and, under the flag of Islam, their home countries might follow the anti-Western way of Russian or Greek Marxists. Of course, Marxism didn?t succeed in destroying the West. But it created a challenger it took half a century to defeat.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper claims that political parties play an independent and active role in mobilizing and ?politicizing? a latent cleavage, where no territorial configuration of social cleavages is expected to bring about a regionally divided electoral split.