Showing 1 through 2 of 2 records.
| 1. Kikuchi, Hirokazu. "Partisanship and Legislative Behavior under the Closed-List PR System: The Case of the Argentine Senate" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, <Not Available>. 2009-11-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p153190_index.html>Publication Type: Proceeding |
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| 2. Caro, Veronica. "LET’S LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN THAT I WILL COME BACK_x000d_Studying Incumbent’s advantage in Legislative elections under PR closed and open lists systems." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, <Not Available>. 2009-11-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p363140_index.html>Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Scholars studying incumbency advantages have focused on identifying and measuring variables that explain and enhance the good chances that incumbents enjoy (Hogan, 2000,2004; Erikson 1971; Mayhew 1974; King 1991;). However, until now, little research has considered the incumbent advantage outside the United States case. Moreover, almost no efforts have been made to investigate the effect that different electoral rules have on the matter. Here, I move beyond the American case and try to explain incumbency advantages in legislative elections under PR closed-list and open-list systems. Building on the premise that in preferential systems (PR-OL) electoral competition tends to be candidate-centric and in PR-CL it tends to be party-centric, I show that incumbency advantages are stronger in cases where voters are entitled to rank their preferences. Colombia offers an interesting scenario to test the previous premise given that in this context parties can choose whether to present open or closed candidate lists. Using electoral data from the 2006 legislative election, I compare the incumbents' advantage in open and closed lists, while controlling for other confounding factors such as length term, term limits and constituency services. |
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