Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper examines why state and local governments have implemented No Child Left Behind so quickly and completely even though they have significant reservations with the law. Its primary finding is that they have complied because of fears of losing federal education funding, even though the total funding at risk for noncompliance represents only between 2 and 8 percent of the total education funding in the United States.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper seeks to explain inter-state variation in non-compliance with European law. While noncompliance has not significantly increased over time, some member states violate European law more frequently than others. In order to account for the variance observed, we draw on three prominent approaches in the compliance literature – enforcement, management, and legitimacy. In the first place, we develop a set of hypotheses for each of the three theories. We then discuss how they can be combined in theoretically consistent ways and develop three integrated models. Finally, we empirically test these models drawing on a unique and comprehensive dataset, which comprises more than 6,300 instances of member state non-compliance with European law between 1978 and 1999. The empirical findings show that the combined model of the enforcement and the management approach turns out to have the highest explanatory power. Politically powerful member states are most likely to violate European law while the best compliers are small countries with highly efficient bureaucracies. Yet, administrative capacity also matters for powerful member states. The UK and Germany are much more compliant than France and Italy, which command similar political power but whose administrations are ridden by bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Compliance with international treaty systems can be effectively monitored by the victims of non compliance and the actors best positioned to detect violations. In cases where the actors most affected by violations are also well positioned to detect and report perceived violations, compliance may be enhanced by empowering them. Even in areas of core state interests such as security and economic prosperity, individuals, groups, and transnational networks are some of the most motivated and best positioned players to monitor and report. At the same time, certain non state actors have covertly assisted governments seeking to violate key treaty obligations. Thus, states and international organizations must consider experts, NGOs, and transnational networks as central actors with regard to compliance. In trade, the WTO-based regime is highly decentralized in monitoring, reporting, and negotiating between member governments. Furthermore, incentives are low to monitor least developed and most developing members.In contrast, the IAEA and nuclear non proliferation system is centralized in its monitoring and reporting, but substantially handicapped in negotiating, publicizing, and taking enforcement actions against violations. Is mutual learning possible? Would the IAEA system be enhanced by greater emphasis on de centralized monitoring and reporting mechanisms (while also improving its information management aystem and inspector training)? How might it be empowered to negotiate and press for compliance more authoritatively? Would a more centralized WTO system empowered to collect information regularly and conduct timely reports be more effective? Could it improve compliance for the majority of its developing and least developed states?

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Legislative delay has been overlooked as a signal of commitment to abide by the terms of an international agreement. Nations face varied international and domestic pressures to formalize international conventions. I argue that this struggle between competing pressures reveals the intentions of each nation to abide by the terms of the agreement. Previous studies of legislative delay neglect important variables, suffer from restrictive assumptions, and fail to frame legislative delay as part of a two stage game. This paper uses the case of the Basel Convention to support my hypotheses. I use Kaplan-Meier and Cox-proportional hazard models to estimate the proportional effects of international and domestic political pressures and resource constraints on legislative delay. After controlling for the type of ratification, legislative delay is a function of previous domestic regulations in the same policy space and the regulatory quality of the nation. These factors signal satisfaction with the convention and represent significant commitments to abiding by its terms.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Why do countries comply with international agreements? While scholars have done rigorous work to address compliance and enforcement in an international game, less analytical attention has been paid to domestic mechanisms of compliance. However, because international agreements have domestic distributional consequences, there exist domestic sources of enforcement. In this article, I develop an analytical framework of domestic accountability, where I identify specific channels of influence through which domestic constituencies can influence national compliance. Using a game theoretic model, I show that a government's compliance decision reflects the electoral leverage and the informational status of domestic constituencies. This framework further provides a theoretical rationale for why and how international institutions may influence states' compliance through domestic mechanisms. The European acid rain regime offers an empirical illustration of the domestic constituency argument.