Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Liberal theories of consent assert that it is possible to determine an individual’s ability and willingness to consent. For example, under the concept of tacit consent as long as an individual remains in a given situation we assume that she has consented to this situation. However, when one delves more deeply into situations requiring consent, it becomes clear that determining an individual’s ability and willingness to consent is not as clear cut as it might appear. In this paper, I examine the issue of how we determine an individual’s consent using the case of female genital mutilation (FGM) in Africa. Specifically, I examine under what conditions it is possible to know for certain if an individual has consented, and if it is ever possible in the case of FGM.
Some feminists, such as Susan Moller Okin, argue that FGM is a harmful cultural practice and must be eradicated. At the same time, liberal multiculturalists, such as Will Kymlicka, argue that perhaps there are elements of FGM that are culturally valuable. As feminists and multiculturalists debate, it seems that the central question is being overlooked: do women actually consent to FGM, and if so, how can we determine their consent? A woman’s status in societies where FGM is practiced is tenuous at best; she is very much a secondary citizen. It is unlikely that a woman would be willing to lower her status even further by remaining on the fringes of society, which is the fate of most unmutilated women. However, many women are cut when they are babies or very young girls, which leaves little doubt as to their lack of consent. Other women simply may not have the information necessary to understand what FGM is and the impact it will have upon their physical, mental, and emotional well-being.
The case of FGM is well suited to demonstrate the dilemmas present in current theories of consent. There tend to be many cases in which consent clearly does not take place, as well as many cases in which a woman’s consent is questionable. However, cases in which consent definitely takes place are few. Furthermore, the cases in which a woman claims to have consented often closely resemble the cases in which a woman has been coerced into FGM. Even if certain conditions appear to have been met, it is risky to conclude that consent has occurred. Asking a woman to choose between being fully integrated into society and keeping her genitals intact is asking her to make an impossible choice. No matter what she chooses, the price of what she has lost is too high, and the notion that she had a choice to begin with becomes meaningless. If there is no choice for her to make, how can she possibly consent? Therefore, in the case of FGM, I argue that it is impossible to determine a woman’s consent with an adequate degree of certainty based on current theories of consent. I will evaluate current conditions of consent based on which actually aid us in considering consent in the case of FGM as I work towards developing standards for consent that do carry meaning for women who face female genital mutilation.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Liberal theories of consent assert
that it is possible to determine an individual’s ability and
willingness to consent. For example, under the concept of tacit consent
as long as an individual remains in a given situation we assume that
she has consented to this situation. However, when one delves more
deeply into situations requiring consent, it becomes clear that
determining an individual’s ability and willingness to consent is not
as clear cut as it might appear. In this paper, I examine the issue of
how we determine an individual’s consent using the case of female
genital mutilation (FGM) in Africa. Specifically, I examine under what
conditions it is possible to know for certain if an individual has
consented, and if it is ever possible in the case of FGM.
Some feminists, such as Susan Moller Okin, argue that FGM is a harmful
cultural practice and must be eradicated. At the same time, liberal
multiculturalists, such as Will Kymlicka, argue that perhaps there are
elements of FGM that are culturally valuable. As feminists and
multiculturalists debate, it seems that the central question is being
overlooked: do women actually consent to FGM, and if so, how can we
determine their consent? A woman’s status in societies where FGM is
practiced is tenuous at best; she is very much a secondary citizen. It
is unlikely that a woman would be willing to lower her status even
further by remaining on the fringes of society, which is the fate of
most unmutilated women. However, many women are cut when they are
babies or very young girls, which leaves little doubt as to their lack
of consent. Other women simply may not have the information necessary
to understand what FGM is and the impact it will have upon their
physical, mental, and emotional well-being.
The case of FGM is well suited to demonstrate the dilemmas present in
current theories of consent. There tend to be many cases in which
consent clearly does not take place, as well as many cases in which a
woman’s consent is questionable. However, cases in which consent
definitely takes place are few. Furthermore, the cases in which a woman
claims to have consented often closely resemble the cases in which a
woman has been coerced into FGM. Even if certain conditions appear to
have been met, it is risky to conclude that consent has occurred.
Asking a woman to choose between being fully integrated into society
and keeping her genitals intact is asking her to make an impossible
choice. No matter what she chooses, the price of what she has lost is
too high, and the notion that she had a choice to begin with becomes
meaningless. If there is no choice for her to make, how can she
possibly consent? Therefore, in the case of FGM, I argue that it is
impossible to determine a woman’s consent with an adequate degree of
certainty based on current theories of consent. I will evaluate current
conditions of consent based on which actually aid us in considering
consent in the case of FGM as I work towards developing standards for
consent that do carry meaning for women who face female genital
mutilation.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper explores contemporary challenges to the citizenship clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. Using racial formation theory to look at attempts to alter birthright citizenship reveals how racializations of migrants and conceptions of citizenship change during a mobilization campaign and in response to external stimuli. The struggle over birthright citizenship has created a more extremist restrictionist movement with schemas about danger, invasion and allegiance which were readily adaptable to post 9/11 America.

Publication Type: Proceeding

Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: Taxes on agricultural exports have long been associated with urban bias and elite control over the countryside. This chapter uses the case of Mauritius (in comparative perspective) to make an alternative argument: export taxation can be a builder both of state capacity and of constructive state-society relations. In particular, governments can use targeted resources from export taxes both to solve collective action problems that accompany restructuring and to compensate critical coalition partners through side-payments. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the colonial sugar export tax directly reinforced demands for democratic accountability and the building of the fiscal state with an unusually high number of Mauritian officials. Resources from the tax were also used to construct corporatist institutions linking state and society. This, in turn, helped to build a dirigiste but embedded state: able to direct scarce private capital into specific activities, and helping to solve the collective action problems that often accompany a sector-wide need for training and technology upgrading. After independence, export tax 'pacts' shaped by bargains between the state and farmers associations became the foundation of an unexpectedly progressive system of revenue-raising, helping to consolidate the new democracy and underpinning the coalition. Finally, through higher sugar prices delivered via the 1975 Lomé Convention Sugar Protocol, the taxation of exports served as a way to make foreign assistance into an ‘earned’ resource, avoiding the deleterious institutional consequences of aid dependence.