Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The use of outsourcing in governmental arenas has recently gained momentum. Public policy such as A-76 has been on the books since 1955. Recent legislation, such as the Federal Inventories and Reform Act (FAIR Act) in mid-1990's and the President's Management Agenda on competitive sourcing have resulted in the use of outsourcing. Only recently has the federal government utilized contractor personnel to help administer government contracts. By learning from state and local governments, the federal government determined that certain areas of the contract administration process may be accomplished by contractor personnel. The theory by which the federal government decided to pursue this practice is "organizational field". Another reason for the utilization of contractor personnel for government contracts administration is the shortage of capacity of qualified governmental personnel on staff. Contractor in contracts office will be explained in terms of delineation of what is "inherently governmental" and what is not. The sensitive area of "organizational conflict of interest" will be discussed in regards to the contracted personnel handling other contractor's proprietary information.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: An increase in the use of private military and security contractors over the last two decades has sparked a debate over whether their employment enhances or detracts from government control of its security agents and policy. Scholarly disagreement on the operationalization of control, however, makes it difficult to answer this question. This article seeks to provide a way forward by back-formulating a theory of �control� and comparing features specific to public versus private agents which may affect control. The author offers the hypothesis that the principles of democratic governance are likely to be more secure when policy is carried out by public agents.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Contract has long been used to shape and facilitate non-commercial, personal or family relations. Casebooks are replete with examples of �bait promises� made by relatively wealthy individuals designed to manipulate the moral conduct of their relatives. Most of these bait promises were unilateral contracts, not binding on the promisee and enforceable against the promisor only if the promisee performed as requested. Some promisees were induced to act in ways that enhanced their own welfare, as by marrying, obtaining an education, or avoiding debilitating vices. Some promisees were induced to act in ways that benefited the promisor, as by giving the promisor medical or nursing care, housing, or other forms of support. Some promisees were induced to avoid immoral or illegal behavior that would be contrary to the promisor�s interest, and it is with these latter kinds of contract that this paper is primarily concerned.
In recent years, unsatisfied with the, largely unforceable, behavioral obligations imposed by the traditional laws of marriage, both married and unmarried couples have sought to create contractual obligations of good behavior barring infidelity, drug use, and other vices that would threaten the relationship. Oddly, the most common judicial response to such �contracts to be good� is to find that they violate public policy.
Is there an appropriate role for contract to play in the private regulation of behavior that is immoral, illegal, or merely undesirable to parties in an intimate relationship? If so, should courts enforce these promises, and if so, how?

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This chapter introduces the puzzling anomaly of Chinese bureaucratic structure, labeled here as bureau-contracting. This hybrid system fuses elements of public bureaucracy (i.e. hierarchical personnel appointment) and private contracting (i.e. market-based financing). The party-state in reform-era China is run by a tiny formal civil service and a sprawling periphery of extrabureaucracies who administer, organize public services, and run businesses. Agents of power are party appointed but partially self-financed with state-awarded privileges, empowering and permitting them to obtain private income from public office. By unpacking the black box of budgetary rules and processes, I show that Chinese public bureaucracies, in practice, own the income they raise. They may generate surpluses or suffer deficits. Drawing on new descriptive statistics and over 165 interviews across localities and governmental sectors, the author systematically identifies the defining features of bureau-contracting and their implications for rethinking the nature of state and market in transitional economies.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: ABSTRACT
The interpretation of international legal instruments becomes entrenched in a dialectical tug-of-war once these instruments enter the space in which they are designed to operate. International treaties and agreements spring from a desire to unify the world � to establish a sort of universal �common sense.� This goal is based on the assumption that the global economy operates within a particular social formation, constructed from specific ideological discourses. This article examines the legal space in which the United Nations Convention on the Sale of Goods (CISG) can thrive in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the broader Commonwealth Caribbean. This article takes a socio-legal approach exploring the multifaceted legal, social and political cultures that exist in the region in order to arrive not at ways to promote uniformity but to prescribe a synthesis of a legal tradition that is often bogged down in a simmering vat of indigenous, Afro-Caribbean, colonial, and post-colonial ideologies. The final question this paper seeks to answer is whether international Treaties like the CISG can operate within the confines of Caribbean legal tradition in a practical way and, perhaps, contribute to legal reform in the region.