Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Hypothesizing candidates use charity networks to transmit information and contribution requests, results show individual contributions rise with charity activity, but political interest limits the use of non-political networks for political purposes.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In the justice literature, a state of equity exists when actors perceive that their outcomes are proportional to their inputs. However, this definition confounds whether actors derive equity from their own and others’ actual contribution, or from contributions relative to what people are capable of giving. In this planned study we describe both a pilot study and a laboratory experiment that establish public goods systems. In those systems, (1) initial endowments are distributed unequally, (2) members contribute unequally, and (3) either absolute contributions or contributions relative to endowments are made salient. Using a formal model for predicting injustice experience, we will test whether these types of contribution play a role in determining perceptions of fairness.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper attempts to resolve a puzzle: The stability or slight decline in the number of campaign contributors since the mid-1960s despite a large increase in one of the more potent causes of such behavior—being asked to make a contribution. We show that the stability in the number of contributors is not due to candidates, parties and elites increasingly targeting individuals who are intrinsically less likely to respond. The gap in the effectiveness of recruitment persists, even after we control for other factors that shape whether individuals make campaign contributions. The key to resolving the puzzle is a recognition that the technology that allowed elites to vastly increase the number of people they solicit for funds has moved monetary recruitment toward less personal and hence less effective means of seeking contributions—specifically, toward more mail and phone solicitations. What is still unexplained is the apparently greater effectiveness of in-person requests for campaign contributions 40 years ago than today. The decline in the effectiveness of in-person monetary recruitment may have more to do with larger changes in American society, such as the decline in social capital and trust.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Political parties have used hard money, soft money, and/or issue advocacy to strengthen party building. But, as soft money and issue advocacy expenditures began to explode, concerns over both the source of these monies and their continued growth helped lead to the passage of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Contribution limits on party contributions, however, remained relatively unchanged under the new law. In this paper we examine what might be gained or lost if contribution limits on party contributions are changed. We examine 88 gubernatorial elections from 1995 to 2002 in 50 states. Analyses of the total dollar amount of party contributions suggest that less restrictive party contribution limits result in political parties being more likely to contribute higher dollar amounts to candidates. This pattern is enhanced when political parties perceive that their contributions are likely to have a greater impact, i.e., in a competitive election. In addition, analyses of the candidates’ reliance on party contributions are supportive of a similar pattern; less restrictive party contribution limits result in candidates being more likely to rely on party contributions, especially when the election becomes competitive. Findings presented in this paper clearly suggest that the financial role of political parties in an election can be enhanced or diminished by making adjustments in the level of political party campaign contribution limits.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Interest groups lobby members of Congress not only to influence votes, but also to
influence the agenda (e.g. Wright 1996). Previous game theoretic models have suggested
that interest groups make campaign contributions to signal the benefits of a policy to an
agenda setter (Austen-Smith 1990, 1993 Austen-Smith and Wright 1994). Other models
have considered the possibility that interest groups bribe agenda setters and voters with
campaign contributions (Dharmapala 1999, Helpman and Persson 1998). In the current
model I suggest that interest groups make campaign contributions to agenda setters in
order to signal the policy preference of voters who must approve of a proposal for it to be
enacted. I find that campaign contributions, although not essential to signaling the policy
preferences of voters, may allow interest groups to make more precise signals to agenda
setters. In addition, agenda setters may grant access to interest groups that make no
campaign contribution at all.