Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In this paper we use data for U.S. House members from 1974 to 2002 to test a series of models of sponsorship and cosponsorship behavior.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Ideal point estimates based on roll-call votes have provided leverage for a wide variety of
theory testing efforts. However, some legislatures have few roll-call votes, strong agenda control,
or very strong party effects, that make roll-call analysis less useful. One proposed alternative
is cosponsorship data. Conceptually similar to roll-call votes, cosponsorship has some appeal
as a measure that avoids many of these problems and is more readily available. However, the
data generating process for cosponsorship is untheorized and understudied. In this paper, we
examine the properties of ideal point estimates from cosponsorship data. We find problems with
the use of cosponsorship data in all but very exceptional circumstances.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: For the most part, legislative parties in parliamentary systems are more cohesive and disciplined than their counterparts in presidential systems. Yet, akin to Congressmen individual MPs have individual electoral incentives, personal and constituency backgrounds that stipulate individual strategies for legislative behavior. In this paper we depart from the parties-as-unitary-actors assumption and study the heterogeneity of parliamentary parties by analyzing networks of bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship in the German Bundestag between 1987 and 2002. While bill sponsorship across the party line is rare, the networks uncover social ties and key positions within parliamentary factions and how these differ across parties. We use methods from network analysis (exponential random graph models) to study the impact of partisanship, parliamentary positions, MPs’ socio-economic background, and, most importantly, electoral incentives on networks of (co-)sponsorship of bills.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Women and politics research emphasizes the importance of identity as a determinant of legislative behavior, while congressional scholars largely ignore identity and focus on the impact of constituency, party, and institutional factors. Using an original database of cosponsorship activity, in the 103rd and 104th Congresses, on five social welfare issues that reflect the gender gap in the mass public, I bring together insights from these two fields to determine the extent to which identity influences policy preferences and how these preferences are constrained by changes in the institutional and political contexts. I find that the policy preferences of elites do reflect gender differences in the mass public, suggesting a link between descriptive and substantive representation. My focus on institutional dynamics demonstrates that women increase their activity on social welfare issues when they gain access to strategic positions of power, particularly majority party status and a seat on a relevant committee, to a greater extent than similarly situated men.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: We study cosponsorship of bills and joint resolutions in the House of Representatives in the 101st-108th Congresses (1989-2004). Our unit of analysis is an individual legislator’s decision to cosponsor each of the 43,596 measures introduced during these Congresses. We ask how characteristics of sponsors, potential cosponsors, and the dyadic relationships between them (including common policy interests, institutional connections, and a history of past cosponsorship interactions) influence the probability of cosponsoring a measure. Our results demonstrate that these variables all affect cosponsorship, but that their impact varies with the timing of the cosponsorship decision and the issue content of the bills. The patterns are consistent with an explanation in which the decision to cosponsor goes beyond shared policy interests. Coordination and logrolling between MCs also appears to be at work.