Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Maximum efficiency is the ultimate goal for all local governments in the state of Wisconsin; however, there exists various forms of government leadership operating the policy and administrative responsibilities. This program evaluation includes a co

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper is aimed at explaining why the organization of some US local administrations resembles the organization of private hierarchies while in others ‘chief executives’ (elected local politicians) have bureaucratized their administrations.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In the course of the 1990s and in particular after September 11, 2001, state-sponsored terrorism has gradually declined. At the same time, terrorist groups operating widely independent from direct state support have gained in significance. Coming from this observation, the purpose of the paper is to examine how the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) responded to this ?privatization? of terrorism. More precisely, the paper, focusing on the post-Cold War period, analyzes whether the SC?s practice to impose binding obligations on UN member states and apply strategies to foster member states? compliance with these obligations differs when it comes to targeting state-sponsored or ?privatized? terrorism. Drawing on UN documents, secondary sources and interviews with UN staff the paper arrives at the following conclusions: Firstly, the SC imposed different sets of binding obligations on member states with respect to state-sponsored and ?privatized? terrorism. To target state-sponsored terrorism, the SC adopted sanctions against state-sponsors and required member states to take - usually limited - steps to implement them. By contrast, in relation to ?privatized? terrorism, the SC obliged states to institute far-reaching measures to prevent and suppress terrorism per se. Secondly, the strategies applied by the SC to foster member states? compliance with binding obligations changed. Following the imposition of sanctions against state-sponsors, the SC remained rather passive and widely refrained from adopting strategies suggested by the Management School and in particular the Enforcement School to enhance member states? compliance. By contrast, to facilitate compliance with the generic obligations imposed to combat ?privatized? terrorism, the SC followed a clearly more active approach most notably in terms of capacity building and other strategies recommended by the Management School. Thus, in a nutshell, the SC?s response to the ?privatization? of terrorism can be summarized as follows: To adapt to the changing features of contemporary terrorism the SC chose to impose generic, more demanding obligations on member states and at the same time turned to focus on strengthening member states? capacities to comply with the heightened demands. Whether this approach is helpful to convince those states which lack the will (rather than the capacity) to implement comprehensive counter-terrorism policies remains to be seen.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In the EU Council of Ministers, decisions can be made either by unanimity or by qualified majority voting (QMV). Yet, QMV is not used very often, and most of the time, ministers decide by consensus.
The descriptions of the practice of consensus show that it is not similar to unanimity strictly speaking. Indeed, when a decision is made by consensus, the President makes a proposal and asks only if anybody has objections against it, without counting the votes. The absence of objections is sufficient in order to adopt a measure by consensus. It means that consensus can be only apparent, since member states which are opposed to the President's proposal might choose not to express their disagreement.
Besides, when QMV is used by the ministers – in about one quarter of eligible cases – participants are already aware of the distribution of preferences and know that the measure can be adopted; voting is used only for "public display", in order to show publicly that one or more member states are outvoted.
The observation of these phenomena drives us to bring up two questions: what is this method of consensus? why does it replace the use of QMV?
The goal of this paper is to put forward some preliminary elements of explanation. First, we will analyze and criticize an intuitive hypothesis proposed in order to explain this phenomenon. Then, we will propose our own hypothesis.
According to the intuitive hypothesis, consensus might be used in order to favour compliance. Indeed, the Council has to adopt binding measures by QMV, since states decided to pool their sovereignties. This constraint might drive outvoted member states to evade compliance. Many commentators argued that majority voting is ill-fitted to decision-making in an intergovernmental frame, and that consensus or unanimity are more efficient.
Yet, research about compliance does not take into account the influence of the decision-rule on implementation and infringements. Indeed, data necessary in order to establish the causal link between the fact that a state was outvoted and its non-compliance are not easily available, and political scientists are able to explain infringements thanks to many other variables. Furthermore, this possible causal link was not researched because it presupposes that states are unitary actors; i.e. that the actor who is responsible for decision-making is also in charge of the implementation process, while there is in fact a plurality of actors. Moreover, it presupposes a form of national consensus about directives and rules adopted by the Council. But such a presupposition is all the more unrealistic since we study "daily decision-making", i.e. the adoption of numerous legislative acts. Thus, the plurality of actors and of legislative acts drives us to argue that the intuitive hypothesis lacks firm empirical and conceptual bases. But state is not the only concept which is ill-defined in this hypothesis. Indeed this hypothesis does not consider the unaccustomed use of majority voting in the Council.
Nonetheless, even though the correlation between the fact that a state was outvoted and its non-compliance cannot be checked, the belief in such a causal link is apparently so strong and intuitive that it might explain why ministers use consensus. But this belief can explain the practice of consensus only if ministers use a consensus which is identical to unanimity and would favour compliance for this reason. Indeed, the intuitive hypothesis presupposes this identity. But this presupposition is false given that when consensus replaces QMV, negotiations are nevertheless influenced by the possibility of QMV, the consensus is made "in the shadow of the vote." Therefore, a decision can be made by an apparent consensus even though some member states are in fact in a minority position. We must also distinguish consensus and unanimity because the legislative activity is more intense in the majority area than in the unanimity area (the speed of decision-making is higher, more proposals from the Commission are adopted), while most decisions pertaining to the majority area are made by consensus. Lastly, the descriptions of decision-making by consensus lead us to distinguish the explicit agreement entailed by unanimity, a counting of votes allowing one to note this agreement, and the use of consensus. Therefore, ministers cannot use consensus because they would believe that it avoids minority positions and favours compliance for this reason.
The intuitive hypothesis is not explanatory because it does not define consensus. In order to explain this practice and the fact that it replaces QMV, we need first to define consensus. Consensus has been described as an ill-defined decision-rule, a kind of "mystery", because it does not consist of a precise numerical threshold that the aggregation of votes should reach, while decision-rules are usually defined as numerical thresholds. But noting this fact amounts to give a clue to a definition of consensus: what first defines the rule of consensus is the absence of a counting of votes.
Thus, given that consensus differs from both unanimity and majority voting because it excludes a counting of votes, and that consensus made "in the shadow of the vote" does not exclude minority positions for some participants, our hypothesis is that consensus often replaces QMV because it prevents member states from being publicly outvoted. The fact that QMV is used at the official stage only to show publicly that some member states are outvoted is an additional argument in favour of this hypothesis. Therefore, our hypothesis takes into account the issue of majority voting on binding measures in an intergovernmental context, but the opacity of consensus leads us to focus on the fact that when member states vote explicitly, some of them are publicly outvoted, rather than on the material losses that a minority position entails.