Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper is a preliminary look at the similarities and differences of the insurgencies in Iraq and Chechnay and at the similarities and differences of American and Russian counterinsurgency efforts respectively. It argues that the Russians have some inherent advantages in Chechnya--smaller country in terms of both terrain and population, greater will to fight the war--than the Americans in Iraq. However, Russian counterinsurgency policy, and in particular the over-reliance on force and failure to include Chechens in the local politics, has increased the likelihood of long-term failure. In Iraq, while the Americans have not conducted themselves flawlessly, their more measured use of force and incorporation of a wider swath of Iraqi society into the political scene increases the likelihood of long-term success. The danger for the Americans, however, is in the short-term.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The impact states’ internal security forces have on the risk and overall course of internal rebellion is under theorized and receives comparatively little systematic analysis in the growing academic literature on civil wars. A major reason for this dearth of analysis stems from the lack of available data on the nature of individual operations initiated during these conflicts and the characteristics of the small units that conduct them. This is unfortunate given the real “action” on the dependent variable of interest for most studies of intra-state violence- battle deaths- is generated by the armed participants of the conflict themselves. This paper uses a new micro-conflict dataset on counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines to test several hypotheses explaining the capacity of a state’s internal security forces, how it is generated and employed down to the operational incident level, and why it is significant in predicting patterns of violence and other activities associated with intra-state conflict. I find that small units possessing superior leadership, training, access to local knowledge, and cooperative relations with local government are more likely to exercise effective and discriminate internal security operations. I also find evidence that government forces exercising higher levels of operational initiative relative to their rebel opponents are more successful along several measures of effective counterinsurgency. These findings emphasize how variation in the qualities of military units tasked with combating internal threats affects conflict dynamics and outcomes. Importantly, they suggest this variation cannot be adequately explained by exogenous factors such state wealth and level of development.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: First, this paper theorizes how guilt and punishment are collectivized in non-conventional wars, focusing on insurgency and counterinsurgency. Sociological, spatial and cultural conceptions of guilt undercut the liberal principle of individual accountability. A logic of complicity peculiar to irregular warfare further erodes the assumption of innocence and exposes people to violence. Second, while taking seriously philosophical arguments about collective action, the article defends the liberal distinction between soldiers and civilians and rejects collectivist accounts of insurgency. Third, the paper examines the current insurgency and counterinsurgency in Iraq, where sweeping methods and tribal mapping have implicated broad swathes of Iraqis. The case of Iraq highlights the challenges of waging a liberal (and legal) counterinsurgency.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In the 1980s, Sikh militants waged a fierce insurgency in hopes of carving out an independent Sikh state from the Indian province of the Punjab. Sikh temples (gurdwaras) were used extensively by militants in that insurgency. The most important of these, the Golden Temple in Amritsar, was the site of two pivotal battles in that insurgency. The first, Operation Bluestar in 1984, was an army operation. The second, Operation Black Thunder in 1988, was a police operation. While Operation Bluestar succeeded in ousting the terrorists and decapitating their leadership, it was a strategic disaster in that galvanized the insurgents? cause and drew the support of Sikhs all over the world. In contrast, Operation Black Thunder is widely revered as the turning point in the Indian government?s efforts to put down that insurgency. This paper will analyze both to understand the reasons for their different outcomes. It will focus upon their operational planning and execution as well as the ways in which the security forces dealt with issues of perception management (e.g. strategic communication). Earlier research by the author suggests that two of the most important differences may include 1) the way in which the security forces understood the ?sacred? nature of the space and planned their operations accordingly and 2) how media operations were conducted to manage public perceptions of the security forces, the operations and of the militants.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Most scholars of civil-military relations believe that the presence of domestic security threats to the state increases the role of the military in politics. However, observational data show that domestic security threats do not always increase the political involvement of the armed forces. And when they do, the effects vary across time and space. What are the causes of this variation? Why do similar levels and types of internal security threats have divergent effects on the degree of civilian control over the armed forces? In this research, my goal is to uncover the mechanisms through which domestic security threats influence the interactions between civilian and military actors and lead to different levels of military involvement in politics. In order to provide an answer to this research question, I conduct a comparative case study by focusing on two countries, namely Turkey and Peru, which have fought against Kurdistan Workers? Party (PKK) and Shining Path insurgents, respectively, from the 1980s onwards. With this study, I intend to show that structural variables, such as the threat level, are not sufficient to explain the degree of military?s role in politics. Instead, I discuss the explanatory powers of international actors?including international organizations and great powers, rational policy makers, and institutional legacies in accounting for how and why the military?s autonomy in counterinsurgency policy making varies across time and space.