Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: A recurrent criticism of the EU’s efforts in the field of security and defence is related to the overlapping and inefficiency of member states defence capabilities. This has usually been justified by the securitisation of national defence industries, an essential feature for the survival of the European nation-states. Nonetheless, recent steps in both the economic (large number of mergers and acquisitions within the European defence industry sector) and the political (security and defence integration measures within the EU) arenas have contributed to changes in that discourse. The creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) is, to a certain extent, resultant from the fusion of developments in these two arenas. Established in July 2004 by the European Union, the EDA was supposed to work on four different areas: defence capabilities development; armaments cooperation; the European defence technological and industrial base and defence equipment market; and research and technology. By looking at how both the creation and evolution of the EDA has been politically justified, it is the goal of this paper to understand how, and to what extent the EDA represents a definitive step in the consolidation of a European discourse on defence industries.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper analyses the moral arguments for ballistic missile defence, focusing in particular on the case made by Just War theorist James Turner Johnston that contemporary missile defence constitutes a form of moral obligation. Drawing on critiques of similar lines of argument put forward in the 1980s, the assumptions and precepts of Johnson’s argument are critically assessed. In the main, it is argued here, these critiques are still of relevance to contemporary moral consideration of ballistic missile defence; however, the general reconfiguration of the concept of imminent threats characteristic of recent preventive war argumentation – most prominently in the National Security Strategy of 2002 – is now also implicitly relied upon to lend added credence to ground the moral case for ballistic missile defence. After outlining Johnson’s moral advocacy of missile defence and its potential limitations, the paper then illustrates this crucial convergence in the moral cases made for preventive war and ballistic missile defence.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: At the heart of the EU’s problems in turning its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) into an effective crisis management instrument are differences among EU member states about what role the EU should play as a security actor in a changing international context, what kind of instruments are to be used in what situation, and what the role of the military should be in all of this? This paper will analyse national responses to ESDP. The central argument presented is that while all EU members face the same pressures emanating from the international environment and ESDP, their responses are culturally conditioned. Growing convergence among EU member governments about the security challenges the EU is facing therefore does not produce convergence with regards to how to address them. The results are conflicting visions about the EU’s role in the world and the function ESDP should perform as an instrument at the EU’s disposal. I will briefly summarize external pressures expected to trigger policy change in EU member states. Second, I will outline a framework for comparative analysis, to examine how EU member states respond to these adaptation pressures. Finally, I will apply this framework to the case of Germany. An appendix sketches initial thoughts on the cases of Austria, France and the United Kingdom.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In May 2003 the European Union (EU) declared its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) fully operational. Simultaneously the EU appeared terminally divided over the conflict in Iraq and transatlantic divisions were emerging highlighting different priorities and approaches to international security. Given that the ESDP was already a contentious political issue within the EU and for transatlantic relations, this paper questions whether the fall out from Iraq will fatally undermine the development of this policy. It will argue that with clear leadership the EU can develop the capacity to be an effective regional security organisation and that the security preferences and approaches on either side of the Atlantic are not mutually exclusive. First, this paper analyses the situation in which ESDP finds itself in the wake of the divisions over Iraq and the implications of this crisis for the future of the policy. This paper argues that without leadership there will be a continuing problem in elaborating some commonality on the use of force in international relations and the nature of security. The European preference for 'soft' power must be complemented by a capacity for 'hard' power if it is to an effective regional security actor and potentially develop a sense of leadership. Second, the paper evaluates the utility of ESDP in the post-September 11 era. The question of the usefulness of ESDP re-emerged as a crucial debate after September 11 because it was seen by many as largely irrelevant to the 'War on Terror'. The fact that the May 2003 operational declaration was itself qualified due to the outstanding capability shortfalls did little to inspire confidence among the sceptics in regard to the EU's capacity and for leadership in this field. Nevertheless, a re-defined military role is still required to enhance stability and uphold the international norms and values of the EU. Ultimately, in the wake of Iraq the EU must define its preferred role for ESDP so that the member states can develop the capacity to ensure its success, giving the EU the leadership in security matters it can command in the economic sphere.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: With the development of European Security and Defence Policy, the EU is assuming both new tasks and new means (civilian and military) as an international security agent. Its ambitions are plainly expressed in the European Security Strategy of 2003, where the Union declares its “readiness to share in the responsibility for global security”. Taking on new tasks, the Union commits itself to acting in various ways: disciplining violators of international norms, supporting stability in the neighbourhood, preventing conflicts, and tackling various security threats. Moreover, it is assuming a role in the defence policies of its member states.

This enormous burden of responsibility partly stems from the increasing expectations directed towards the Union. Whether the Union at all can be said to be a credible agent to assume such responsibilities depends crucially on two questions: first, its capacities, and second, its degree of independence as an agent. One could argue that the EU might not be the best organisation for carrying responsibility for security and defence when compared with NATO in terms of capabilities. Yet, capabilities are not enough; the agent also needs to be sufficiently independent from other agents to be held responsible. This chapter therefore tackles the question of the EU’s independence from the member states, from NATO, and from the UN. It argues that the EU is pushed to assuming functions of both states and defence alliances at a pace which might temporarily worsen rather than improve overall security, but may in the long run be the only effective way to handle security policy.