Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: I analyze agent selection in a case of international delegation that recently gained prominence when several WTO disputes were decided against powerful member states for violating the Agreement in their national health and (food) safety regulations.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This article uses Rational Design (Koremenos et al., 2001) to explain the institutional choice of international delegation. The paper has two primary objectives: to test the Rational Design conjectures about the use of delegation and to analyze the correlation between delegation and other institutional design variables. The data for the article come from the United Nations Treaty Series, which features the most comprehensive set of formal international agreements concluded since the end of World War II. I find that delegation is widespread, with almost one half of international agreements calling for it. Dispute resolution is the most commonly delegated function and often involves externally delegating authority to an existing arbitration tribunal or an international court. As suggested by rational design, delegation, and especially external delegation, increases with the existence of complex cooperation problems, including problems of enforcement and uncertainty. Delegation increases with the heterogeneity and number of parties as well the average level of democracy of the signatories, but is unrelated to the existence of a superpower signatory and to the risk aversion of signing states. These patterns are consistent in multivariate analyses, thereby challenging preexisting beliefs about delegation to international institutions.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Delegation to an international agent is a useful but risky strategy for states seeking to create gains in an issue area when unilateral or non-delegating cooperative strategies are relatively ineffective. While the threat of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons use provides a good explanation for why states choose a collectively costly and risky strategy such as delegating to an international agent, this explanation is incomplete without a fuller analysis of the costs states pay to acquire from and reveal to an IO the information necessary to make delegation a productive strategy.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: An established line of research demonstrates that context is an important influence on civilian death
tolls. Variance in observed body counts thus presents a puzzle. Why do noncombatant body counts
vary even when states face similar conditions and incentives to kill? I argue that the relationships
between governments and the perpetrators receiving the killing order are central to understanding
this puzzle. The decision to kill is a function of the conditions and incentives governments face,
and of the government’s beliefs about what will happen once it decides to kill. Once the decision
is made, it must be implemented: somebody needs to pull the trigger. Perpetrators who obey
the order may face punishment for killing by international actors. At the same time, perpetrators
who disobey the killing order risk punishment by the government. Using a game-theoretic model, I
identify circumstances under which death tolls may vary even when states faces similar conditions
and incentives to kill. I also find ample support for the claim that observed killing is the outcome
of a strategic interaction between government and perpetrator.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: I examine the extent to which, and the conditions under which, supranational agents are able to take advantage of their discretion to pursue their own policy preferences – for example, by seeking to advance the process of European integration beyond the lowest-common denominator preferences of the EU member governments. Faced with the threat of such supranational activism, I argue, member-state principals adopt both administrative procedures and oversight mechanisms in order to limit supranational discretion; yet these control mechanisms are themselves costly and are unlikely to be perfectly effective in preventing agents from pursuing their own preferences. In this context, I argue that the autonomy and influence of a given supranational organization depends primarily upon the efficacy and credibility of various control mechanisms established by member-state principals, and that these vary both across organizations and over time, leading to varying but predictable patterns of supranational autonomy and influence.